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THE ILLUSION OF AUTONOMY IN WOMEN‘S  
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 
JAMIE R. ABRAMS 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article considers why there is not more conflict between women and their doctors in 
obstetric decision-making. While patients in every other medical context have complete au-
tonomy to refuse treatment against medical advice, elect high-risk courses of action, and 
prioritize their own interests above any other decision-making metric, childbirth is viewed 
anomalously because of the duty to the fetus that the state and the doctor owe at birth. Many 
feminist scholars have analyzed the complex resolution of these conflicts when they arise, 
particularly when the state threatens to intervene to override the birthing woman‘s autono-
my. This Article instead considers the far more common scenario when women and their 
doctors align in the face of great decision-making complexity and uncertainty. What deci-
sion-making framework normalizes this doctor-patient alignment, and how does this deci-
sion-making framework complicate the actualization of autonomy for the women who do not 
elect this framework? This Article concludes that many, if not most, of the four million 
women who birth in hospital settings attended by physicians align with their doctors by 
applying a shared decision-making framework that presumptively elects the outcome that 
minimizes any, even minor, risks to the fetus. While individual patients can certainly elect 
this approach autonomously, when understood in the context of tort law—in which the ac-
tions of ―most women‖ and ―most doctors‖ can become the standard of care itself—this 
framework is deeply concerning.  
 This fetal-focused decision-making framework perpetuates an illusion of autonomy be-
cause doctors can apply the framework independently and universally. This decision-
making model problematically resurrects the ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s medical model in which 
doctors effectuate decision-making autonomy for women. Understood through a tort law 
lens, while this illusion of autonomy might not seem problematic to the individual women 
who elect this framework, it risks imputing a distorted standard of care to all obstetric cases 
by creating a primacy that always prioritizes fetal risks over maternal risks, a primacy that 
explicitly contravenes existing tort standards. Tort law ordinarily governs ―unreasonable 
risks,‖ whereas this framework elevates any fetal risk to an unreasonable risk and reduces 
any maternal risk short of death to reasonable. It risks imputing to all women a standard 
requiring the complete acceptance of medical guidance.  
 This Article concludes that tort law standards should explicitly govern not just the 
―what‖ of childbirth outcomes, but the ―how‖ of childbirth decision-making by using deci-
sion-making aids to ensure that women‘s autonomy is actual and not illusory. Incorporating 
decision-making aids in the standard of care would remedy the illusion of autonomy by 
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ensuring that ―most women‘s‖ decision-making frameworks are not presumptively applied to 
all women so as to distort tort law and undermine patient autonomy. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Article occupies an uncomfortable, but necessary, place for 
women‘s rights—it considers how ―most women‖ navigate medical 
decision-making in childbirth. It considers why there is not more con-
flict between women and their doctors over medical decision-making 
in childbirth. It does so to reveal the critical importance of the tort 
law lens to actualizing women‘s birthing autonomy. 
 While patients in every other medical context have complete au-
tonomy to refuse treatment against medical advice, elect high-risk 
courses of action, and prioritize their own interests above any other 
decision-making metric, childbirth is viewed anomalously because of 
the duty to the fetus that the state and the doctor owe at birth.1 The-
se duties have led to excessive medical interventions,2 forced medical 
procedures, and criminal prosecutions against pregnant and birthing 
                                                                                                                                 
  1. See Lidia Hoffman & Monica K. Miller, Inconsistent State Court Rulings Concern-
ing Pregnancy-Related Behaviors, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 279, 280 (2009) (explaining how the 
state has a ―compelling interest‖ in protecting human life after viability). 
  2. See generally THE BUSINESS OF BEING BORN (New Line Home Video 2008) (depicting 
the interventionist cycle of American childbirth, including labor-inducing drugs, forceps, ce-
sarean sections, and pain medications); MARSDEN WAGNER, BORN IN THE USA: HOW A 
BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST BE FIXED TO PUT MOTHERS AND INFANTS FIRST 5 (2006) 
(explaining how obstetricians ―find medical solutions to normal situations‖ in childbirth).  
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women.3 Reproductive rights scholarship has defended women‘s au-
tonomy in medical decision-making when conflicts arise between 
women and their doctors,4 women and the state,5 and women and 
their fetuses.6 This scholarship lens examining conflict is vital to 
women‘s autonomy.7 
 This Article instead considers the far more common scenario when 
women and their doctors align in the face of great decision-making 
complexity and uncertainty. Despite historical advocacy for choice, 
most women regularly enter the most expensive and interventionist 
childbirth health care system in the world with great normalcy.8 
Most medicalized hospital births still lack adequate informed con-
                                                                                                                                 
  3. See, e.g., Nina Martin, A Terrifying Precedent: Woman to Be Tried for Murder for 
Giving Birth to Stillborn, SALON (Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/22/ 
a_terrifying_precedent_woman_to_be_tried_for_murder_for_giving_birth_to_stillborn/ (report-
ing on a woman‘s prosecution for depraved heart murder after her baby was stillborn with its 
cord wrapped around its neck with trace amounts of cocaine byproduct detected). See generally 
Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women 
in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women‘s Legal Status and Public Health, 
38 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 299, 331 (2013) (chronicling the arrests and forced interven-
tions of hundreds of pregnant women nationwide and concluding that these forced inter-
ventions are pervasive and ―raise numerous concerns about the health and dignity afforded 
to pregnant women in the United States‖).  
  4. See generally Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors‘ Orders: Unmasking the 
Doctor‘s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 451 (2000) (ex-
plaining how conflicts between women and doctors can arise at any time from conception to 
birth on issues ranging from testing to delivery methods). 
  5. See Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 283 (explaining how the state cannot gen-
erally require one to subordinate her rights to others, even to save a life, but pregnant 
women can be compelled by the state to ―undergo a particular medical treatment [that] 
conflicts with her right to self-determination and bodily integrity‖); Margo Kaplan, ―A Spe-
cial Class of Persons‖: Pregnant Women‘s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 187-89 (2010) (explaining how forced medical inter-
ventions infringe on women‘s constitutional rights in ―abhorrent‖ ways because they allow 
the ―state to determine for a woman what risks she must assume for the benefit of the fe-
tus and physically appropriate[] her body to serve the state‘s interest in the fetus,‖ when 
the state orders no ―similar sacrifices in the context of saving the lives of third parties‖); 
Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the In-
formed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2001) (explaining how a birthing woman‘s right to informed consent 
is ―balanced against state and public concerns‖).  
  6. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 472 (explaining how the fetus is seen as a ―second 
patient who faces greater risks of serious morbidity and mortality than does the mother‖). 
  7. CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 2 (1997).  
  8. See WAGNER, supra note 2, at 9 (concluding that Americans pay ―more per capita 
for maternity services than any other country in the world‖); RICHARD W. 
WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 63, 141 
(1977) (explaining the historically interventionist role that doctors have played in child-
birth); Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-way-of-birth-
costliest-in-the-world.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining the ―sticker shock‖ American 
women experience where charges for childbirth have tripled since 1996).  
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sent9 and are largely uncontested by the four million women who give 
birth in this manner each year.10 From a tort law lens, the birthing 
experience of ―most women‖ greatly influences the governing stand-
ard of care applied to all women and is therefore a critical unex-
amined site for study.  
 What decision-making framework normalizes the frequency of 
doctor-patient alignment in obstetric care, and how does this deci-
sion-making framework complicate the actualization of autonomy for 
the women who do not elect this framework? This Article concludes 
that many women align with their doctors by applying a decision-
making framework that always seeks to reduce all risks to the fetus 
regardless of maternal risks or materiality.11  
 This decision-making framework might actualize the autonomy of 
the women who elect this approach, but it perpetuates an illusion of 
autonomy that is problematic to the women who do not elect this 
framework.12 This illusion of autonomy resurrects the ghost of Roe v. 
Wade‘s medical model, in which doctors effectuate decision-making 
autonomy for women.13 Understood in a tort lens, this illusion of au-
tonomy risks imputing a distorted standard of care to all obstetric 
cases by creating a primacy that always prioritizes fetal risks over 
maternal risks regardless of likelihood or severity, a primacy that is 
explicitly inconsistent with existing tort standards.14 Tort law ordi-
narily governs ―unreasonable risks,‖ whereas this framework ele-
vates any fetal risk to an unreasonable risk and reduces any mater-
nal risk short of death to reasonable.15 It risks imputing to all women 
a standard that their autonomy is presumptively exercised by the 
complete acceptance of medical guidance.16  
 This Article concludes that tort law standards should explicitly 
govern not just the ―what‖ of childbirth outcomes, but the ―how‖ of 
childbirth decision-making by using decision-making aids to ensure 
                                                                                                                                 
 9. Numerous feminist scholars and historians have chronicled and analyzed the ab-
sence of meaningful informed consent in childbirth interventions. Proper informed consent 
requires presenting the birthing woman with alternatives and medically accurate and 
complete information, including risks to the birthing woman, not just those to the fetus. 
See, e.g., Ketler, supra note 5, at 1031 (explaining that ―the doctrine of informed consent 
was founded upon the notion that adult persons have a fundamental right to bodily self-
determination‖).  
 10. See, e.g., PHYLLIS L. BRODSKY, THE CONTROL OF CHILDBIRTH: WOMEN VERSUS 
MEDICINE THROUGH THE AGES 7-9 (2008) (explaining how a ―doctor knows best‖ attitude 
prevails in childbirth).  
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 13. See infra Part VI.C. 
 14. See infra Parts VI.A–B. 
 15. See infra Part VI.A. 
 16. See infra Part VI.B. 
2014]  WOMEN‘S MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 21 
 
 
that women‘s autonomy is actual and not illusory.17 Incorporating 
decision-making aids in the standard of care would remedy the illu-
sion of autonomy by ensuring that ―most women‘s‖ decision-making 
frameworks are not presumptively applied to all women so as to dis-
tort tort law and undermine patient autonomy. 
II.   NORMALCY AND CONFORMITY DOMINATE CHILDBIRTH 
 Despite the propensity for conflict and difference that childbirth 
seems to present,18 childbirth today is pervasively medicalized, hospi-
talized, and intervention-oriented.19  
A.   The Normalized Medical Interventionist Model 
 Despite choice in birth methods,20 modern childbirth remains 
heavily normalized around a medicalized and intervention-oriented 
model. A survey on Listening to Mothers II considered women‘s expe-
riences with hospital births and concluded that ―labor is literally 
pushed by routine or common measures‖ upon healthy populations 
through labor induction, augmentation, and direction, and it is also 
―pulled by interventions such as vacuum extraction/forceps, cesarean 
section, pulling on the cord to hasten birth of the placenta, and sepa-
ration of babies from mothers after birth.‖21  
 Modern childbirth is ―almost always‖ in a hospital.22 It is the lead-
ing cause of hospitalization today.23 Only 33,043 babies are born at 
home for every four million births in hospitals,24 while 98.7% of all 
                                                                                                                                 
 17. See infra Part VI. 
 18. Adele E. Laslie, Ethical Issues in Childbirth, 7 J. MED. & PHIL. 179, 181 (1982) 
(noting that this normalcy has been criticized for ―imposing one model of treatment and 
care on individuals in widely differing circumstances,‖ yet conformity persists). 
 19. Advocates have sought to de-medicalize childbirth, but this view has not prevailed 
pervasively. DEBORAH LUPTON, MEDICINE AS CULTURE: ILLNESS, DISEASE AND THE BODY 
154 (3d ed. 2012).  
 20. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should 
Be Supported, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345 (2008) (highlighting birthing choices). 
 21. Carol Sakala & Maureen P. Corry, Evidence-Based Maternity Care: What It Is and 
What It Can Achieve, MILBANK MEM‘L FUND 28 (2008), available at 
http://www.childbirthconnection.org/pdfs/evidence-based-maternity-care.pdf. 
 22. Laslie, supra note 18, at 185. 
 23. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that six of the fifteen most common 
hospital procedures are related to childbirth).  
 24. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 NAT‘L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 
51 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf. However, 
some data positively suggest that the number of home births is increasing. Id. at 10 (indi-
cating that ―[t]he number of births occurring at home (33,043) [in 2011] was the highest 
since reporting began for this item in 1989‖ and that the number of out-of-hospital births 
attended by Certified Nurse Midwives also rose by 6% from 28.6% in 2005 to 30.2% in 
2011); see also BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 177 (noting that the incidents of fetal death are 
identical in hospital and home deliveries).  
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babies are born in hospitals.25 This is a marked historical shift within 
the last century.26  
 Modern childbirth is routinely overseen by physicians. Obstetri-
cians hold a virtual ―monopoly . . . over the maternity care system.‖27 
Of modern hospital births, 86.1% are performed by doctors of medi-
cine, 7.6% by nurse midwives, and 5.8% by doctors of osteopathy.28 
The medicalization of childbirth has dramatically exaggerated the 
role of doctors in birthing care and entrenched it.29 This is a modern 
continuation of ―heroic‖ medicine traditions whereby physicians sup-
planted midwives and treated pregnancy with increasingly interven-
tionist measures.30  
 The rate of cesarean section births in the United States is particu-
larly normalized. The rate of cesarean sections rose every year from 
1996 to 2009, including a single year increase of seven percent.31 Alt-
hough the use of cesarean deliveries seems to have remained steady 
in recent years, the procedure accounted for 32.8% of all registered 
births in the United States during 2011.32 About one in three babies 
is delivered by cesarean section today compared to one in five babies 
in 1996.33 With the increased cesarean rate comes the increased risks 
                                                                                                                                 
 25. Martin et al., supra note 24, at 10.  
 26. In 1900, ―less than 5% of women delivered in the hospital.‖ WERTZ & WERTZ, su-
pra note 8, at 133. In 1940, fifty-five percent of births were in hospital settings, and by 
1960, eighty-eight percent were in hospital settings. JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, BROUGHT TO 
BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA 1750 TO 1950, at 171 (1986). Generally, the non-hospital 
births were in rural areas. Id. 
 27. See, e,g., WAGNER, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that obstetricians oversee ninety 
percent of American births and maintain a ―monopoly . . . over the maternity care system,‖ 
while comparatively midwives oversee seventy-five percent of births in industrialized 
Western countries like Australia, Netherlands, and Great Britain). ―[H]aving an obstetrical 
surgeon manage a normal birth is like having a pediatric surgeon babysit a normal two-
year-old.‖ Id. at 5. 
 28. Martin et al., supra note 24, at 10. Notably, the number of hospital births attend-
ed by certified nurse midwives in 2011 reflects a six percent increase since 2005. Id. This 
increase also applies to the number of births attended by certified nurse midwives outside 
of the hospital. Id.  
 29. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 141 (―By 1920 doctors believed that ‗normal‘ 
deliveries . . . were so rare as to be virtually nonexistent.‖).  
 30. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A 
HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 23-24, 28-30 (1973) (documenting the class distinctions of 
this transition whereby upper-class women first used physicians as medical attendants). 
Today there are approximately 5700 working nurse midwives in the United States. U.S. 
DEP‘T OF LABOR, BUR. OF STAT., OCCUPATIONAL EMP‘T & WAGES, MAY 2012: 29-1161 NURSE 
MIDWIVES, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2012/may/oes291161.htm. 
 31. Martin et al., supra note 24, at 10. In 2011, vaginal deliveries constituted 
2,651,428 of the 3,953,590 registered births in the United States. Id. at 52. 
 32. Id. at 10.  
 33. Shankar Vedantam, Money May Be Motivating Doctors to Do More C-Sections, 
NPR (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/08/30/216479305/money-may-
be-motivating-doctors-to-do-more-c-sections; see also Erin M. Johnson & M. Marit Rehavi, 
Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth 2-3 (NBER 
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of health complications to women. As major abdominal surgery,  
cesarean births increase risks of infection and recovery complications 
to women.34  
 Modern childbirth is almost universally reliant on medical inter-
ventions.35 Childbirth was historically a ―natural‖ event.36 Doctors 
transformed childbirth over time into a series of ―more precise and 
effective manipulations and interventions, both to prevent and to 
cure disease‖ which ensured that doctors were ―on the lookout for trou-
ble in birth.‖37 Modern birth is viewed as ―something that cannot be left 
alone, that must be interfered with, monitored and ‗helped along.‘ ‖38  
 Modern birth is heavily managed in its timing and pacing. It is 
characterized by the frequent artificial rupturing of the water, in-
ducement and augmentation of labor, and managed pain treatment.39 
Labor induction is the ―use of drugs and/or techniques to cause labor 
to start, as opposed to waiting for labor to begin on its own through a 
complex interplay of maternal and fetal factors.‖40 The percentage of 
medically induced labors rose by 135% from 9.5% to 22.3% between 
1990 and 2005.41 This has in turn contributed to earlier gestational 
                                                                                                                                 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19242, 2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19242 (noting variability in cesarean rates across states from 
22.6% in Alaska to 39.7% in Louisiana). 
 34. Johnson & Rehavi, supra note 33, at 8. See generally Sakala & Corry, supra note 
21, at 44 (describing the numerous adverse health complications of cesarean delivery). 
 35. See, e.g., Peter B. Angood et al., Blueprint for Action: Steps Toward a High-
Quality, High-Value Maternity Care System, 20 WOMEN‘S HEALTH ISSUES S18, S24 (2010). 
Women‘s accounts of childbirth in the hospital revealed the use of Oxytocin to speed labor 
fifty-seven percent of the time, the rupturing of the membrane sixty-five percent of the 
time, the use of epidurals in seventy-six percent of births, the administration of IVs in 
eighty-three percent of births, the cathertization of the bladder in fifty-six percent of 
births, the use of forceps in seven percent of births, and cesarean deliveries in thirty-two 
percent of births (sixteen percent for first-time births and sixteen percent for repeat 
births). Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 27.  
 36. BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 11 (explaining how in ancient times women‘s bodies 
were more physically fit and prepared for the task of childbirth, and they birthed smaller 
babies); WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 141 (noting that one Boston doctor in 1923 urged 
women to redefine birth ―not as ‗something natural and normal, and not worth the time of 
obstetricians and specialists‘ charges,‘ but as ‗a complicated and delicately adjusted pro-
cess, subject to variations from the normal which may be disastrous to the mother or baby, 
or both‘ ‖); Ellen S. Lazarus, What Do Women Want? Issues of Choice, Control, and Class in 
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 8 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 25, 27 (1994). 
 37. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 8, at 136.  
 38. LUPTON, supra note 19, at 153. 
 39. BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 142-43 (noting that epidurals were used in at least 
ninety percent of all medical deliveries in the 1980s). 
 40. Sakala & Corry, supra note 23, at 35-37 (including breaking the membrane and 
using drugs). 
 41. Id. at 16 (noting that these validation studies suggest that these rates only identi-
fy 45-61% of the induced labor). 
24  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:17 
 
 
births for singleton babies from an average of forty gestational weeks 
to thirty-nine gestational weeks.42  
 Some women are requesting cesareans and inductions from their 
doctors independently.43 Many others are undergoing these interven-
tions without adequate informed consent at their doctor‘s direction.44 
In the Listening to Mothers II survey of childbirth in U.S. hospitals, 
forty-one percent of women said that a health professional suggested 
inducing labor in eighty-four percent of the cases, and a total of thir-
ty-four percent of the respondents actually had a medically induced 
labor.45 Eleven percent of the respondents ―felt pressure‖ to induce.46 
 Fetal monitoring technology has become standardized too. It is the 
most common obstetrical procedure performed in the United States.47 
While fetal monitoring technology emerged and garnered acceptance 
in the 1960s,48 it was originally used only for high-risk pregnancies.49 
Today, electronic fetal monitoring technology ―is the standard of care 
in virtually every community,‖50 despite persistent questions regard-
ing its reliability and concerns regarding its basis for medicalized in-
terventions.51 Approximately eighty-five percent of all annual births 
in the United States use electronic fetal monitoring.52  
                                                                                                                                 
 42. Id.  
 43. See Chris McCourt et al., Elective Cesarean Section and Decision Making: A Criti-
cal Review of the Literature, 34 BIRTH 65, 65 (2007) (identifying convenience, patient 
choice, and psychological factors, especially concerning negative experiences in prior child-
births and fear relating to childbirth, the perceived safety of a cesarean, and social and 
cultural factors). 
 44. ―It is dubious that women have been sufficiently informed about the possible risks 
associated with artificial stimulation of labor, including over-stimulating the uterus, fetal 
distress, more painful contractions, and the cascade of procedures that may follow.‖ 
BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 143. 
 45. Sakala & Corry, supra note 23, at 36.  
 46. Id. at 37, 44 (listing consequences and side effects associated with inducing labor).  
 47. Thomas P. Sartwelle, Electronic Fetal Monitoring: A Bridge Too Far, 33 J. LEGAL 
MED. 313, 313 (2012). 
 48. Id.  
 49. ANGELA DAVIS, MODERN MOTHERHOOD: WOMEN AND FAMILY IN ENGLAND, C. 1945-
2000, at 85 (Lynn Abrams et al. eds., 2012).  
 50. Sartwelle, supra note 47, at 313.  
 51. SHEILA KITZINGER, THE POLITICS OF BIRTH 46, 91 (2005); Sartwelle, supra note 47, 
at 313-14 (―[I]ts scientific foundation is feeble; inter-observer/intra-observer reliability is 
poor; the false-positive prediction of fetal distress rate is greater than ninety-nine percent; 
it has substantially increased the cesarean section rate with attendant mortality and mor-
bidity; and it failed completely in its initial stated promise—reducing by half the incidence 
of cerebral palsy (CP), mental retardation (MR), and perinatal mortality.‖). 
 52. Sartwelle, supra note 47, at 313; see also Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 27 
(noting that women‘s own accounts reveal a seventy-one percent usage of ―continuous‖ fetal 
monitoring and another sixteen percent usage ―most‖ of the time). 
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 And most of these interventions occur without proper informed 
consent.53 Doctors readily acknowledge informed consent models gov-
erning childbirth and pregnancy are different because of the treat-
ment of the woman and the fetus.54 ―Most of the time, medical inter-
ventions are employed without considering the woman‘s choice or ob-
taining informed consent‖; women merely sign a general permission 
of care form upon admission.55 Many women assume that the fre-
quency and regularity of these interventions means that they are al-
ways in their best interest, unaware that ―they may be exposed to 
avoidable and potentially harmful interventions . . . because of a lack 
of transparent comparative performance data to guide decisions and 
limited access to some effective high-value alternatives.‖56 Women 
report wishing they knew more about the risks and side effects of the-
se procedures.57 The pace of labor can complicate informed consent. 
Women report feeling dependent in labor on health professionals to 
make effective decisions ―about which tests or procedures were in fact 
intrusive.‖58 
 And these interventions are heavily interconnected. ―As one inter-
vention justifies or increases the likelihood of using others, the cumu-
lative effect is to create a distorted understanding of childbirth as a 
time when things are likely to go wrong and intensive medical man-
agement is required.‖59 These interventions disrupt the natural process 
of birth and ―incur a cascade of secondary interventions used to moni-
tor, prevent, and treat the side effects of the initial interventions.‖60 
 These interventions are normalized and costly even though they 
may not conform to the standard of care. The medical costs of child-
                                                                                                                                 
 53. See, e.g., BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 142-43 (contesting the ―informed consent 
model‖ governing the doctor-patient relationship in childbirth); Ketler, supra note 5, at 
1033 (explaining how underlying presumptions in historic cases position birthing women 
as ―incompetent, irrational, ruled by nature, and therefore unable to make informed deci-
sions‖ and noting that even modern cases position women as vulnerable and weak); Marjo-
rie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 
YALE L.J. 219, 221 (1985). 
 54. Oberman, supra note 4, at 472. See generally Pamela Harris, Compelled Medical 
Treatment of Pregnant Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 133, 134 (2001) (noting how informed consent is believed to be more complicated in 
childbirth because of the fetus).  
 55. BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 166; see also KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 46, 91; An-
drew Iverson Almand, Note, A Mother‘s Worst Nightmare, What‘s Left Unsaid: The Lack of 
Informed Consent in Obstetrical Practices, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 565, 593 (2012) 
(―Why are such seemingly material risks of drugs and procedures unconscionably being 
withheld from expectant mothers by obstetricians? Without a doubt, every mother would 
expect to be told the preceding information, yet so few actually receive it.‖). 
 56. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S25. 
 57. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 66. 
 58. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 37. 
 59. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 28. 
 60. Id. 
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birth have risen by $3 billion annually from 1996 to 2009.61 Costs are 
particularly high for interventionist childbirths in hospital settings.62 
Yet, critically, these interventions are not achieving better outcomes. 
The United States spends far more on medicalized childbirth, yet 
lags behind many countries in key indicators.63 The U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services‘ Healthy People 2010 report found 
that the United States is moving away from healthy birth weight 
targets and experiencing a rise in maternal mortality rates.64 This is 
particularly so for women of color and lower-income women.65 And 
women are having more physical and mental problems immediately 
after birth.66  
 ―Most women‖ experience a medicalized birth in a hospital setting 
with sub-standard informed consent. To the extent that maternal-
doctor alignments are normalized within certain patterns, this raises 
the question of which cultural norms are being endorsed and sus-
tained.67 Lisa Ikemoto explained this powerfully as the ―Code of Per-
fect Pregnancy,‖ where essentialism prevails and acts to 
direct the power of the state at women along race, class, and cul-
ture lines in the name of ―protecting fetal interests.‖ The resulting 
narrow standard . . . has an effect beyond that of taking from 
women the authority to construct pregnancy and motherhood for 
themselves; it also eliminates the possibility of difference.68  
                                                                                                                                 
 61. Vedantam, supra note 33 (noting how obstetricians may be paid more for cesarean 
sections). 
 62. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 15, 47 (explaining that the average charge in 
2005 ranged from $7000 for uncomplicated vaginal deliveries to $16,000 for complicated 
cesarean deliveries and that non-hospital births averaged $1624).  
 63. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S24 (―The United States spends far more than all 
other countries on health care, yet lags behind many on currently available global mater-
nal and newborn indicators.‖). Maternal and newborn hospital charges totaled $86 billion 
in 2006, far exceeding those of any other hospital condition. Id. 
 64. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 3. The World Health Organization reports that 
twenty-nine nations have better rates for maternal mortality in childbirth, thirty-five na-
tions have better rates for neonatal mortality, and twenty-three nations have lower rates of 
low birth weight births than the United States. Id. at 17 (reporting 2005 data for mortality 
rates and 2003 data for low birth weights). 
 65. See, e.g., Angood et al., supra note 35, at S27 (noting particularly that black, non-
Hispanic women were increasing in negative health statistics for neonatal deaths, low 
birth weight infants, and other negative birthing outcomes). 
 66. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 16 (indicating that women birthing in hospitals 
in 2005 reported high rates of new-onset physical and mental problems in the first two 
months after birth, with many problems persisting to six months or more postpartum).  
 67. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 30, at 28-30 (documenting the class dis-
tinctions of pregnancy). 
 68. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology 
of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of 
Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1208 (1992).  
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The relative normalcy of a dominant birthing experience therefore 
bears further examination.  
B.   The Propensity for Frequent Conflict 
 The uniqueness of obstetric care would seem to present the oppor-
tunity for more conflict.69 It is one of the only medical contexts in 
which a doctor considers possible liability to two potential litigants—
the fetus and the birthing woman—and in which the state has ex-
pressed a clear interest and willingness to intervene.70  
 Typical obstetric care involves a series of decisions made with im-
perfect information surrounding the simultaneous health risks facing 
both the fetus and the birthing woman.71 Obstetric decisions fre-
quently involve medical considerations that threaten or invoke both 
the health of the pregnant woman and the fetus.72 These decisions 
include cesarean delivery or vaginal labor, electronic fetal monitor-
ing, responses to breech positions, vaginal births after cesarean sec-
tions, and choice of pain management.73  
 Obstetric medicine is an imperfect, judgment-based practice that 
responds to uncertainty.74 It relies heavily on science and skill, but at 
bottom, doctors are acting with informed judgment in resolving con-
flicts involving some degree of uncertainty.75 There is little consensus 
within the medical community regarding which services are essential 
to maternal care and which interventions actually improve health 
outcomes, which should cause more variation in medical decision-
making.76 Even where there is medical consensus, that consensus 
does not necessarily match the realities of the medical care that is 
                                                                                                                                 
 69. See MANUAL OF OBSTETRICS 404 (Arthur T. Evans & Kenneth R. Niswander eds., 
6th ed. 2000) (explaining that the ―[m]anagement of labor should achieve delivery in a rea-
sonable period of time while providing maternal support and avoiding any significant com-
promise to the mother or fetus‖).  
 70. See generally Harris, supra note 54, at 158 (explaining that ―[a]s this idea of ma-
ternal tort liability grows, a pregnant woman‘s choices diminish and the state begins to 
play a role in her pregnancy‖). 
 71. See Oberman, supra note 4, at 451 (explaining how conflicts between women and 
doctors can arise at any time from conception to birth on issues ranging from testing to 
delivery methods). 
 72. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN‘S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF 
FETAL RIGHTS 3, 42 (1993).  
 73. Law, supra note 20, at 366. 
 74. See KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, HOW DOCTORS THINK 3 (2006) (explaining how doc-
tors draw on skill as well as judgment in making decisions).  
 75. Id. (noting how medical education teaches what is ―known‖ in medicine and then 
the clinical apprenticeship prepares doctors to act in response to the uncertainty). 
 76. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S34 (documenting a ―lack of consensus on a com-
prehensive package of essential maternity services that have been shown to improve health 
outcomes, and should be covered by public and private insurance,‖ which leads to ―unwar-
ranted variation in maternity care‖).  
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provided. Some ―[p]ractices that are disproved or appropriate for 
mothers and babies in limited circumstances are in wide use, and 
beneficial practices are underused.‖77  
 This variation in best practices should lead to more variety of pa-
tient choice. There are choices available, women are competent to 
make the choices, and ―reasonable professionals, and hence reasona-
ble patients, disagree‖ about which options are best.78 Literature 
available to birthing women describing the range of childbirth and 
child rearing perspectives also offer competing, even contradictory, 
theories that would suggest more disagreement or conflict to be re-
solved in doctor-patient relationships.79 Given the individuality of 
birth, the range of options and choices presented, and the lack of 
medical consensus in standards of care, why then is there not more 
conflict or disagreement between doctors and birthing women?  
C.   The Relative Normalcy of Alignment and 
Absence of Conflict 
 Yet, but for a few iconic cases,80 very few women actually sue or 
explicitly challenge this medicalized, interventionist model of child-
birth.81 ―Most women‖ do not explicitly object to these interventions 
contemporaneously or retroactively. Rather, women‘s accounts of 
hospitalized childbirth and medicalized childbirth ―indicate[] that 
they had a rather ambivalent response to‖ the hospitalization and 
medicalization itself.82 While ― ‗some women are alienated by their 
experience of medicali[z]ed birth,‘ ‖ many women across social classes 
                                                                                                                                 
 77. Sakala & Corry, supra note 21, at 1. ―Many maternity practices that were origi-
nally developed to address specific problems have come to be used liberally and even rou-
tinely in healthy women‖; these practices include labor induction, epidural analgesia, and 
cesarean sections. Id. at 4. ―Available systematic reviews also do not support the routine 
use of other common maternity practices, including numerous prenatal tests and treat-
ments, continuous electronic fetal monitoring, rupturing membranes during labor, and 
episiotomy.‖ Id. 
 78. Law, supra note 20, at 366.  
 79. See DAVIS, supra note 49, at 114 (noting the ―tensions, ambiguities, and indeed the 
contradictions that are present in the women‘s accounts‖ of caring for children). 
 80. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem‘l Reg‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 
1247, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 1999); Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 991 (D.C. 2010) (―Of 
course, [the doctor] could not ‗order‘ surgery without the patient‘s consent.‖); Ketler, supra 
note 5 (examining patient control and autonomy in labor and birth). 
 81. See Jamie R. Abrams, Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1955 (2013) (concluding that women rarely sue for birthing harms); see 
also David M. Engel, Perception and Decision at the Threshold of Tort Law: Explaining the 
Infrequency of Claims, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 293-94 (concluding that fewer than one in 
fourteen personal injury victims consults a lawyer, only one in fifty sues, and nine out of 
ten never contact injurer or insurance company of injurer). Sparse tort literature considers 
why this is so, although speculation considers money, time, and aggravation as possible 
explanations. Id. at 294.  
 82. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 107.  
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welcome medical intervention, if not management, and are quite sat-
isfied with hospital deliveries.83 Women‘s interviews describing epi-
dural anesthesia and caesarean sections, for example, are not de-
scribed as ―turning points‖ in labor, but rather ―just another proce-
dure undergone.‖84  
 In the relatively rare cases when doctors and birthing women con-
flict in decision-making, the results of judicial intervention have been 
notably mixed and inconsistent.85 Where conflicts do arise, occasion-
ally courts resolve the dispute between the birthing woman‘s selected 
course of action and the doctor‘s recommended course of action.86 
Some courts have held that women‘s decision-making autonomy is 
absolute, while others have said that the rights of the fetus or the 
state override her rights.87 This uncertainty—particularly when it 
derives from high-profile cases—emphasizes a divide, which leaves 
women with little clarity regarding their birthing rights.88 The law 
certainly recognizes a strong presumption in favor of maternal au-
tonomy, but that autonomy is far from absolute.89 The inconsistency 
                                                                                                                                 
 83. TINA MILLER, MAKING SENSE OF MOTHERHOOD, A NARRATIVE APPROACH 31, 73 
(2005) (quoting Bonny Fox & Diana Worts, Revisiting the Critique of Medicalized Child-
birth: A Contribution to the Sociology of Birth, 13 GENDER & SOC‘Y 326, 328 (1999)).  
[W]omen ―regardless of social class or ethnicity . . . spoke about childbirth as a 
natural process, but at least to some degree, they accepted the medical view of 
birth: that any number of things could go wrong and that ultimately they had 
to rely on authoritative knowledge and concomitant technological expertise of 
their physician to ensure that they had done everything possible to have a 
healthy baby.‖  
Id. at 73 (quoting Ellen Lazarus, What Do Women Want? Issues of Choice, Control, and 
Class in American Pregnancy and Childbirth, in CHILDBIRTH AND AUTHORITATIVE 
KNOWLEDGE: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 132, 133 (Robbie E. Davis-Floyd & Carolyn 
F. Sargent eds., 1997)). That is certainly not to say that women are universally happy with 
their birthing experiences. Women do state that they want more information and they are 
not always happy with the relationships underlying the care they are given, a point that 
might ordinarily increase the likelihood for suit. Angela Davis‘s account in Modern Mother-
hood explains that women surveyed about their birthing experiences did ―often report[] 
their unhappiness with obstetric interventions,‖ but she concludes that this was ―as much 
a criticism of the lack of information they received, the lack of choice they felt that they 
had in their care, and their dissatisfaction with their medical attendants (doctors, mid-
wives, and nurses), as their dislike of the procedures themselves.‖ DAVIS, supra note 49, at 
107. Women might report that they received ―excellent medical care‖ overall but still criti-
cize the interpersonal treatment they received from hospital staff. Id. 
 84. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 98. 
 85. See Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 280 (concluding that ―[d]ifferent state 
courts have issued many competing decisions, which emphasizes a lack of unification in 
this area of law‖). 
 86. Oberman, supra note 4, at 451.  
 87. Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 288.  
 88. Id. at 289. 
 89. See, e.g., STRONG, supra note 7, at 183. The author concludes as follows:  
The bodily integrity of mentally competent individuals who are persons in the 
descriptive sense is an extremely important ethical value. Control over one‘s 
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itself creates ―confusion for women concerning the scope of their legal 
protections.‖90  
 Constitutional approaches addressing women‘s decision-making 
autonomy and state interventions do not translate effectively into the 
private clinical setting of obstetric medical care.91 Nor have constitu-
tional frameworks yielded consistent outcomes. Even cases that are 
deeply enshrined as beacons of patient autonomy, such as Schreiber 
v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin,92 do not provide workable 
guidelines explaining when doctors should follow maternal decision-
making and when they can override it.93  
 This inconsistency and lack of clarity, however, has not necessi-
tated or yielded any explicit tort standard or medical standard to ad-
dress the anomalous nature of childbirth. At the moment of birth, 
doctors owe a duty of care to both the birthing woman and the fetus, 
and the doctor can be sued by either.94 Nowhere in tort literature or 
precedent is the complexity of childbirth decision-making fleshed out 
in a primacy lens clarifying how doctors should respond if these du-
ties conflict.95 Nowhere in tort literature or precedent is a workable 
methodology presented for resolving disputes that might arise from 
decision-making conflict between the woman‘s autonomy and her 
doctor‘s duty to the fetus in birth, revealing the relative normalcy of 
alignments and rarity of conflict. 
 Likewise obstetric training texts generally make no mention 
whatsoever of the possibility of conflict or resolution of it, further 
supporting the normalcy of alignment and rarity of conflict. For ex-
ample, Williams‘ Obstetrics text, a leading text in obstetric practice, 
                                                                                                                                 
body is a crucial aspect of self-determination. Only the most compelling of reasons 
would justify a significant violation of the physical integrity of a person‘s body. 
Id. at 180. 
 90. Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 280.  
 91. See STRONG, supra note 7, at 4-6 (describing a disconnect between clinical ap-
proaches and policy frameworks); WENDY SIMONDS ET AL., LABORING ON: BIRTH IN 
TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES (2007) (explaining how doctors in a practice group set-
ting often do not know the birthing preferences of patients at delivery).  
 92. 588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999). 
 93. Ketler, supra note 5, at 1054 (―Furthermore, Schreiber fails to give physicians any 
guideline whatsoever about where their duty to renegotiate informed consent ends.‖).  
 94. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that 
doctors owe a duty of care to the fetus). Precisely when that duty begins and how it might 
change throughout the course of the pregnancy is not clearly defined in tort law.  
 95. For example, the Restatement of Torts likewise is silent on these issues. There is 
no positioning of obstetric care in any way as anything different than general medical mal-
practice claims. There is no description of the dual duties owed or the tort complexities 
raised. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 37. 
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makes no mention of conflicting duties or potential ethical conflicts 
that may arise between women and their doctors.96 Foundations of 
Maternal & Pediatric Nursing, a foundational text used to train stu-
dents in maternal and pediatric nursing, says nothing whatsoever 
about the distinction or complexities of managing two duties at birth 
and the conflicts this might present.97 In Charles R.B. Beckmann et 
al.‘s Obstetrics and Gynecology, there is a general statement that the 
rights of the woman and the fetus create ethical considerations that a 
doctor must resolve, but no guidance about how to resolve issues.98 
And this is not occurring regularly in clinical instruction either. Ra-
ther, ―little time is spent in resident programs in medical specialties 
on bioethics, informed consent, professional responsibility, and com-
municating with patients.‖99 
 Modern birth is extremely normalized toward the alignment of 
women and their doctors. The question then becomes, what decision-
making framework are women and doctors applying to yield this 
alignment?  
III.   HOW ―MOST WOMEN‖ MAKE DECISIONS IN CHILDBIRTH 
 This section considers possible explanations for the normalcy of 
maternal-doctor alignments in obstetric decision-making. It first 
highlights briefly the existing accounts of women‘s decision-making 
in childbirth. It then concludes that a shared framework in which 
women and doctors align to focus on the minimization of all fetal risks 
accounts for much of women‘s alignment with their doctors. The re-
mainder of this Article will consider the implications of this fetal-focus.  
A.   Existing Accounts of Decision-Making in Childbirth 
 One explanation for the normalcy of women-doctor alignments is 
that it reflects the ongoing subordination of women. Theories reflect-
ing the subordination of women in reproduction are well documented 
in feminist scholarship and women‘s history. This explanation de-
fines women‘s subordination by their reproductive function.100 Innu-
merable historical examples exist of childbirth as subordination, par-
                                                                                                                                 
 96. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS (23d ed. 2010). 
 97. LOIS WHITE, GENA DUNCAN & WENDY BAUMLE, FOUNDATIONS OF 
MATERNAL & PEDIATRIC NURSING (3d ed. 2011). 
 98. CHARLES R. B. BECKMANN ET AL., OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 25 (6th ed. 2010).  
 99. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 41. 
 100. See generally ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 175 (1986) (explaining how ―Eve‘s 
curse‖ creates a ―social victimization of women-as-mothers‖).  
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ticularly as birth moved into hospitals and during the ―Twilight 
Sleep‖ movement.101  
 The reproductive subordination of women has particularly target-
ed women of color and poor women.102 Powerful historical accounts 
exist of doctors forcing and coercing sterilizations on poor women.103 
Lynn Paltrow‘s modern pioneering work documents the race and 
class distinctions of forced interventions today. She concludes that 
―low-income women and women of color, especially African American 
women, are overrepresented among those who have been arrested or 
subjected to equivalent deprivations of liberty.‖104 Fifty-nine percent 
of the forced interventions were on women of color and seventy-one 
percent were on economically disadvantaged women.105  
 Modern reproduction subordination is less about women‘s subor-
dination to doctors and more about women‘s subordination to their 
fetuses.106 The fetus is ―the newest ‗social actor‘ in the American con-
servative imagination.‖107 Some modern political framings have posi-
                                                                                                                                 
 101. Hospital births and professionalized medicine distinctly shifted the balance of 
power, pushing out women‘s domestic support systems. See LEAVITT, supra note 26, at 181, 
190. In the mid-nineteenth century obstetric care model, women were ―willingly submitting 
their bodies to their physicians without questioning,‖ and ―[i]nstead of women birthing 
their babies, their babies were ‗delivered‘ from them.‖ BRODSKY, supra note 10, at 7-8. In 
the ―Twilight Sleep‖ movement characterized by the heavy use of sedatives, women were 
―knocked out while their babies were ‗dragged out‘ ‖ by obstetricians, and their babies were 
born ―floppy,‖ ―sedated,‖ and difficult to be stimulated. Id.  
 102. See generally SIMONE M. CARON, WHO CHOOSES? (2008) (chronicling the troubling 
history of racialized interventions in the reproductive choices of the poor and of African-
American women); DANIELS, supra note 72, at 53 (concluding that women of color or in 
lower economic status are ―more likely to be subject to forced medical treatments‖); 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-
CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 102 (2011) (chronicling how medical stereo-
typing leads to unequal access to high quality medical care and concluding that ―[b]lacks 
are less likely to get desirable medical interventions and more likely to get undesirable 
interventions that good medical care would avoid‖); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Autonomy Sus-
pended: Using Female Patients to Teach Intimate Exams Without Their Knowledge or Con-
sent, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL‘Y, 240, 263 (2005) (describing the performance of intimate 
exams on patients absent full consent as a phenomenon that has ―short-circuited the ethi-
cal sensitivity of many medical educators, who clutch to a variety of rationales for dispens-
ing with the simple step of disclosing forthrightly the educational nature of practice proce-
dures and asking permission‖). 
 103. CARON, supra note 102, at 213-14 (describing a high-profile account of Carol 
Brown, a woman in South Carolina who was pregnant with her fifth child and could not 
find a doctor in her town to deliver her baby unless she agreed to forced sterilization). 
 104. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 3, at 300-01 (examining more than four hundred 
cases of arrests, detentions and forced interventions in forty-four states from 1973 to 2005).  
 105. Id. at 311. 
 106. See DANIELS, supra note 72, at 49 (explaining how physicians and hospital admin-
istrators have become ―much more inclined to compromise the patient‘s right to autonomy 
in the interests of fetal health,‖ and they ―lean heavily in favor of forced medical treat-
ment‖ under the guise of ― ‗sav[ing]‘ fetal life‖).  
 107. Id. at 3, 9 (explaining that this political framing emerged in the 1980s from a con-
vergence of ―cultural, political, legal, and technological developments,‖ which collectively 
brought ―the fetus into the public consciousness as an independent and autonomous being‖).  
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tioned the fetus as ― ‗housed‘ inside the pregnant woman‘s body‖ in 
which it can become ―victimized by the woman‘s neglect, ignorance, 
or abuse.‖108 This fetal characterization ― ‗reduces women to incuba-
tors‘ who are seen not as ‗full-fledged human beings, but merely bet-
ter or worse vessels for fetuses.‘ ‖109 Certainly subordination still ex-
ists, yet this account cannot fully explain the normalcy of alignment 
in decision-making because it fails to account for increased women‘s 
autonomy, and it needs to contemplate changing political and social 
conceptions of the fetus.  
 On the other extreme, is some measure of the normalcy of women-
doctor alignments explained by the success of the women‘s movement 
and consumer health movement securing women‘s decision-making 
autonomy? Doctor-patient relationships were historically more pa-
ternalistic, particularly in childbirth.110 Activists successfully chal-
lenged this model of care in the 1970s and strengthened women‘s ac-
tive decision-making through informed consent.111 The ―authoritarian 
physicians‖ of times past are being replaced by ―doctors who enthusi-
astically support, or at least accept, the self-motivated patients who 
seek out information for themselves.‖112 Indeed, ―[r]espect for auton-
                                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. at 28 (explaining how conservative politics have depicted the fetus as the ―vic-
tim‖ of women‘s ―excesses and freedoms‖); LUPTON, supra note 19, at 166 (―The pregnant 
woman is increasingly portrayed as separate to and the adversary of her own pregnan-
cy/fetus, by presenting a ‗hostile‘ maternal environment or refusing proposed medical  
intervention.‖).  
 109. Linda Greenhouse, Should a Fetus‘s Well-Being Override a Mother‘s Rights?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/09/arts/should-a-fetus-s-well-being-
override-a-mother-s-rights.html?pagewanted=print.  
 110. See MARTIN L. PERNOLL, BENSON AND PERNOLL‘S HANDBOOK OF 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1 (10th ed. 2001) (noting that ―the paternalistic care model,‖ 
which gave the physician the right to determine how much information a patient received 
about her condition and possible treatments, is ―waning‖); Law, supra note 20, at 363-64 
(describing how ―[t]raditions of paternalism and disrespect for patient choice‖ permeated 
the childbirth experience as women‘s care became routine in hospitalized settings by the 
1950s, historically including sedation, removal by forceps, episiotomies to facilitate the 
forceps, and restraints).  
 111. See generally Holly Goldberg, Informed Decision Making in Maternity Care, 18 J. 
PERINATAL EDUC. 32, 34 (2009).  
 112. RIMA D. APPLE, PERFECT MOTHERHOOD: SCIENCE AND CHILDREARING IN AMERICA 
161 (2006). Apple cautions, however, that ―we must be careful not to romanticize this mod-
ern partnership of mother and physician.‖ Id. at 168. It has ―created a new clinical world 
for both patient and doctor, a world in which there are no simple rules or procedures. Co-
operation between mothers and experts should be our goal. But it will not be easy to at-
tain.‖ Id. This success story explanation might be further supported by the increased role 
of women in obstetric care and the role of choice in health services as women ―shop around‖ 
for the ―right doctor.‖ MILLER, supra note 83, at 74, 77-78 (describing how women‘s narra-
tive accounts position the selection of hospitals, doctors, and pain relief protocols as means 
of gaining or retaining control). But see ANN BOULIS & JERRY A. JACOBS, THE CHANGING 
FACE OF MEDICINE: WOMEN DOCTORS AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 
152 (2008) (concluding that ―although differences in practice styles between male and fe-
male physicians exist . . . [s]ocial and structural factors will ultimately restrict such gen-
der-linked differences‖). Women are actively seeking out hospitals and doctors in ways that 
34  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:17 
 
 
omy has become the dominant and controlling principle in both in-
formed consent law and medical ethics.‖113 Modern women‘s relation-
ships with their medical experts are normatively framed more as a 
partnership, ―albeit an unequal partnership,‖ whereby women work 
with their medical caregivers and, in turn, practitioners seek to un-
derstand their patients‘ needs and encourage patients to bring ques-
tions and be informed.114 The American Medical Association acknowl-
edges that ― ‗[t]he patient‘s right of self-decision can be effectively ex-
ercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an 
informed choice‘ and that ‗the patient should make his or her own 
determination about treatment.‘ ‖115  
 Women still value and retain a strong appreciation of science and 
medical expertise, but they also inform themselves and supplement 
medical guidance.116 Women have more access than ever to infor-
mation about childbirth. They rely on books, the Internet, and rela-
tionships to supplement the expertise of their doctor, providing a di-
verse array of perspectives.117  
 Yet importantly, not all women are attaining such idealized part-
nerships. Rather, many women are not ―afforded the ability of shop-
ping for a doctor that will honor their beliefs.‖118 Class, immigration 
status, insurance coverage, and geography reveal that this explana-
tion cannot entirely account for the absence of conflict in medical deci-
sion-making. ―Poor women are constrained by the conditions under 
which they have babies and the kind of care open to them . . . and this 
affects their ability to acquire knowledge about birth and their ability 
                                                                                                                                 
assert their control over childbirth. Today, nearly half of the students enrolling in medical 
school are women. See id. at 2. (comparing this statistic to the eleven percent of women 
medical students in 1970). The authors caution that ―complete integration remains elu-
sive.‖ Id. at 190. Women are particularly strongly represented in pediatrics and obstet-
ric/gynecology practice areas. See id. at 66 (noting that women represent 53% of pediatri-
cians and 34.3% of OB/GYNs).  
 113. Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-
Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 87 (2010). 
―[A]bsent the pregnant woman‘s consent, her doctor has no more right to adopt the fetus as 
his ‗second‘ patient than he does to make any of her other living children, or even her hus-
band, his patient.‖ Oberman, supra note 4, at 473. 
 114. APPLE, supra note 112, at 125, 139 (2006) (explaining how these shifting hierar-
chies were brought about by the Women‘s Health Movement and reformers such as Grantley 
Dick-Reid‘s work on Childbirth Without Fear and Fernand Lamaze‘s focus on childbirth pre-
paredness, as well as the transformative publication of Our Bodies, Ourselves). 
 115. Moulton & King, supra 113, at 87.  
 116. APPLE, supra note 112, at 153 (noting that they do not rely much on innate expertise). 
 117. Id. at 144. See generally MAY FRIEDMAN, MOMMYBLOGS AND THE CHANGING FACE 
OF MOTHERHOOD (2013) (documenting the diverse range of maternal experiences reflected 
in the ―mamasphere‖ and the vast numbers of women who engaged in Internet ―dialogue 
and interactivity‖ to share experiences).  
 118. Hoffman & Miller, supra note 1, at 289. 
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to act on such knowledge.‖119 Poor women more often give birth in 
public hospitals where they face long waits and interact with innu-
merable ―nurses,‖ ―aides,‖ ―clerks,‖ ―nutritionists,‖ ―social workers,‖ 
and doctors.120 These institutional and inter-personal obstacles im-
pede the flow of information, lead to contradictory advice, and com-
plicate autonomy.121 Poor women birthing in public hospitals ―rarely 
reach[] a point at which they ha[ve] sufficient knowledge to manipu-
late the system to obtain more influence over their childbirth.‖122 As 
the 2010 Blueprint on Maternity Care Report concluded, in the cur-
rent model of hospital-based maternity care ―[t]he vision of engaged 
and empowered childbearing women and families at the ‗center‘ of 
well-coordinated maternity care is largely unrealized at present.‖123  
 And even the exercise of autonomy requires careful study of the 
doctor-patient relationship because informed consent requires unbi-
ased thorough counseling.124 This is particularly important given the 
anomalous distinction of childbirth where the doctor needs to present 
information regarding maternal risks and fetal risks. We generally 
endorse the principle of individual autonomy but it is harder to posi-
tion in the doctor-patient relationship.125 Women do not hold total 
agency in childbirth,126 nor is that necessarily the goal.127 Thus, while 
the actualization of women‘s autonomy might partly explain the ab-
sence of conflict, it is far from a complete or universal explanation.128 
 Alternatively, do birthing women and doctors align with such 
normalcy because women acquiesce to medical expertise? This expla-
nation aligns with a longstanding historical shift to the primacy of 
                                                                                                                                 
 119. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 26 (internal citation omitted). 
 120. Id. at 32.  
 121. Id. at 32-33, 39 (further noting that women are, in turn, frustrated by these infor-
mation gaps, and they struggle to even communicate that dissatisfaction to caregivers). 
 122. Id. at 39. 
 123. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S35 (concluding that the modern system ―does not 
engage consumers as partners and empower them to take an active role in coordinating 
their own care‖).  
 124. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 436-37 (2006). 
 125. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221. 
 126. See, e.g., LUPTON, supra note 19, at 154 (noting that, despite these movements, 
―recent commentators have pointed out that such a shift in discourse and practice has not 
necessarily liberated women to enjoy freedom and agency while in childbirth‖). 
 127. MILLER, supra note 83, at 31 (revealing ―ways in which . . . expert knowledge is not 
rejected or even particularly resisted, but rather engaged with and thereby reinforced‖). 
 128. See Rebecca A. Spence, Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When 
Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 75, 97 (argu-
ing that all women do not enjoy ―meaningful birthing rights‖ and that ―feminist lawyers 
can and must play a part in developing a robust conception of reproductive justice that 
includes birthing women, centering and prioritizing the needs of those with the least access 
to reproductive freedom‖).  
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doctors in reproductive decision-making.129 Women endure tremen-
dous pressure to be ―perfect mothers.‖130 This involves a deep pres-
sure to make decisions that do not negatively impact their children.131 
It is child-centered and it relies on the role of experts.132 If women do 
not ―do everything (which means availing herself of technological 
birth), the process is her individual responsibility, and ultimately she 
must be blamed if she does not have the perfect birth.‖133 
 In this context, even for women, it is harder to position autonomy 
in the doctor-patient relationship when we hire doctors because of 
their expertise.134 Women‘s own accounts of childbirth confirm that 
they ―seek out and prioritise what they see as expert knowledge.‖135 
In fact, women have ―increased engagement with expert bodies of 
knowledge and practices‖ and report that such practices are ―reassur-
ing‖ and help them ―allay fears around perceived risks.‖136 This reli-
ance on experts is part of a transitional process into motherhood 
whereby uncertainty is mitigated by risk avoidance: ―[S]ecurity is 
maintained throughout this period of transition based on a relation-
ship of trust in experts and the knowledge that appropriate and re-
sponsible preparation, which implicitly diminishes risk, is being un-
dertaken.‖137 After birth, many women subsequently ―question their 
‗expert‘ preparation‖ and question experts, demoting the positioning 
of experts.138  
                                                                                                                                 
 129. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 30, at 28-30; LEAVITT, supra note 26, at 191. 
 130. Erika Horwitz, Resistance as a Site of Empowerment: The Journey Away from 
Maternal Sacrifice, in MOTHER OUTLAWS: THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF EMPOWERED 
MOTHERING 43, 44 (Andrea O‘Reilly ed., 2004); see, e.g., JULIE BORT, AVIVA PFLOCK & 
DEVRA RENNER, MOMMY GUILT (2005) (proposing principles of a ―guilt-free‖ philosophy of 
mothering); PHILIP G. PETERS, JR., HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? OBLIGATIONS TO THE 
CHILDREN OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 256 (2004) (describing the risks to ―future chil-
dren‖ in modern reproductive technologies and proposing greater regulation that would 
―minimize the risks that they impose on future children by proceeding cautiously  
and carefully‖).  
 131. Horwitz, supra note 130, at 47.  
 132. Charlotte Faircloth, ‗Intensive Motherhood‘ in Comparative Perspective: Feminism, 
Full-Term Breastfeeding and Attachment Parenting in London and Paris, in PARENTING IN 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: NEGOTIATING IDEOLOGIES OF KINSHIP, SELF AND POLITICS 119, 122 
(Charlotte Faircloth, Diane M. Hoffman & Linda L. Layne eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
PARENTING IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE] (explaining how critics of intensive motherhood say 
that it reduces the agency of children, and the effect of ―peers and social climate on child 
development is eclipsed through this focus on parents‖).  
 133. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 25, 27 (internal citations omitted). 
 134. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221. 
 135. MILLER, supra note 83, at 48. 
 136. Id. at 74. 
 137. Id. at 61; see also id. at 72 (―Through engagement with the medical profession and 
the regular monitoring of their pregnancies the women could be seen to be preparing to 
become mothers, in appropriate ways, reducing risk and acting responsibly.‖).  
 138. Id. at 61-62 (describing this subsequent questioning as part of becoming a mother 
and ―regaining a sense of . . . self‖). 
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 Acquiescence to medical expertise in childbirth also often involves 
acquiescence to technology. Modern women rely less on social support 
and inter-generational guidance, and defer more to technological un-
derstandings of pregnancy and childbirth.139 This changes the calcu-
lus of deference to medical expertise by leaving women to ironically 
perceive ―greater uncertainty and risk‖ when expert knowledge is 
ordinarily called upon to achieve more certainty and predictability.140 
 Acquiescence to medical expertise invokes historical skepticism, 
however. As Lupton concludes, ―[w]omen‘s deference to the ‗doctor 
knows best‘ ideology may be related to the asymmetry of information 
between doctors and patients, socialized respect for professionals 
with specialized training and for men in general.‖141 It puts doctors in 
a position to ―preempt patient authority.‖142 Women‘s own accounts of 
childbirth question the autonomy of acquiescence. They express frus-
tration that their doctors acted like ―they, rather than their ‗patients,‘ 
knew best.‖143 Women who knew and trusted their attendants be-
lieved their attendants ―acted in their best interests‖ and ―remem-
bered their care far more positively,‖ while those with poor interper-
sonal relationships reported less positive experiences.144  
 The acquiescence to medical expertise explanation is further com-
plicated by the complexities of modern medical decisions. Physicians 
work within a complex web of forces that shape their own decision-
making, including private insurers, federal programs, and hospitals 
administrations.145 While women‘s subordination, autonomy, and ac-
quiescence to medical expertise might explain some degree of wom-
en‘s alignment with their doctors, these accounts are polarized and 
even demonizing at times. The next section explores a more complex 
and nuanced explanation. 
B.   The Shared Fetal-Focus Framework 
 Some women and their doctors align in decision-making by adopt-
ing a framework that always selects the outcome that minimizes any 
risks to the fetus, presumptively and universally subordinating risks 
                                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. at 49-51 (noting how this phenomenon has been described as ―technobirth‖). 
 140. Id. at 48 (noting that this has moral underpinnings grounded in ― ‗responsible‘ 
motherhood‖). 
 141. LUPTON, supra note 19, at 158.  
 142. Shultz, supra note 53, at 221. 
 143. Angela Davis, Choice, Policy and Practice in Maternity Care Since 1948, HIST. & 
POL‘Y (May 30, 2013), http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/choice-policy-
and-practice-in-maternity-care-since-1948 (emphasis added). 
 144. See DAVIS, supra note 49, at 107. 
 145. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 40 (noting that medical services are provided by many 
genuinely caring medical providers, but within the confines of a profit-based system). 
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to the birthing woman.146 This explanation raises complex and perva-
sive issues regarding how we understand obstetric care, decision-
making methodologies, birthing autonomy, and reproductive rights. 
As the next section explores, while this decision-making methodology 
might actualize the autonomy of the women who elect it, it normaliz-
es a problematic standard of care that creates an illusion of autono-
my for all women.  
 While shared medical decision-making is not unique to childbirth, 
it is particularly distinct when the decision-making lens is focused on 
a putative third party—the fetus. This is not exclusively a problem 
involving doctors or the state giving primacy to fetal interests. Ra-
ther, doctors and women patients both purport to function in a fetal-
focused frame.  
 Doctors do acknowledge that they often act primarily to minimize 
fetal risks. Many care providers admit that they feel ―legally (or mor-
ally) responsible for the fetus and as such may override the needs of 
the women in order to assist the fetus.‖147 The focus on minimizing all 
fetal risks has been offered to explain the absence of adequate in-
formed consent in childbirth as well.148 The unique presence of the 
fetus in birth might 
account for the seemingly lax manner in which the informed con-
sent doctrine has been applied in such cases. In the circumstances 
of labor and birth, the mother‘s individual right to informed con-
sent must be weighed against a heavier counterbalance—the new-
born infant—which carries with it a heavy load of emotional and 
cultural force.149 
                                                                                                                                 
 146. Despite its joyous and celebratory framing, pregnancy and childbirth is still dan-
gerous for women. Indeed the maternal mortality rate in the United States has nearly 
doubled in the last two decades, hovering between twelve and fifteen deaths per 100,000 
live births between 2003 and 2007. Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2007, 58 
NAT‘L VITAL STAT. REP. 13 (2010), available at http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/ 
nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf. In addition, considerable racial disparities exist in maternal mortal-
ity rates. The maternal mortality rate for African American women was 26.5, roughly 2.7 
times the rate for white women (10 deaths per 100,000 live births). Id. Although maternal 
mortality declined dramatically over the last century, the ratio has increased over the last 
several decades. U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD HEALTH USA 2008–2009, 
at 24 (2009), available at http://mchb.hrsa.gov/publications/pdfs/childhealth200809.pdf.  
 147. Sue Kruske et al., Maternity Care Providers‘ Perceptions of Women‘s Autonomy 
and the Law, 13:84 BMC PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH 4 (2013); see also Jamie Abrams, Dis-
torted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1955 (2013) (conclud-
ing that women are subordinated to fetuses in the dual patient model). 
 148. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Inter-
ests, Women‘s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L.& MED. 567, 600-03 (2011). 
 149. Ketler, supra note 5, at 1039-40. 
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Fear of costly litigation for fetal harms might also drive doctors to 
prioritize minimizing all fetal risks.150 Scholars have previously 
acknowledged how this fetal focus is problematic for women.151  
 Notably, however, many women are also electing the decision-
making framework that minimizes any risks to the fetus although 
the rationales and implications are quite different for women than for 
doctors. Many women‘s own framings of childbirth have changed 
too.152 Childbirth is often understood as a sacrifice distinctly of wom-
en‘s health in the name of perceptively or actually minimizing risks 
to their fetus. Many identify mother as ―synonymous with sacri-
fice.‖153 ―[M]others are now being usurped in the public consciousness 
by their fetuses,‖154 reflecting a ―giant collective wish for perfect 
mothering.‖155 This leaves ―the stakes of motherhood . . . so high.‖156 
One anesthesiologist described her own delivery as follows:  
I don‘t really care about the birth experience like a lot of patients 
do—into soft lights, soft music garbage. For me it was getting a 
good baby. I‘ve seen too many times where patients are so con-
cerned about it being a lovely experience for them that this has 
overridden the desires for having a good baby and they put them-
selves and their birth experience in front of having a ―good‖ baby 
come out and having the best care for that baby.157  
 These cultural shifts continue into parenting too. Many women 
today deploy ―intensive mothering‖ frameworks ―focus[ing] on chil-
                                                                                                                                 
 150. OB/GYNs face great medical malpractice liability, in terms of the frequency of 
lawsuits and the magnitude of the verdicts recovered. See generally AM. COLL. OF LEGAL 
MED., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SURVIVAL HANDBOOK (2007). The American College of Legal 
Medicine reports that nearly eight out of ten OB/GYNs have been sued at least once in 
their career, and almost half have been sued three or more times. Id. at 341, 347-48 (noting 
that these suits are often for shoulder dystocia or failure to perform a timely cesarean de-
livery). These suits often yield high monetary damages because of the extent of injuries 
(e.g., cerebral palsy) and the emotionally compelling nature. Id. Recovery rates are nearly 
fifty percent greater in obstetric malpractice claims than overall medical malpractice 
claims. Id. at 347. 
 151. KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 87 (―[G]iving prime consideration to the fetus as a 
patient and seeing the woman merely as a container for it, she is reduced to a being a 
non-person.‖). 
 152. SHARI L. THURER, THE MYTHS OF MOTHERHOOD: HOW CULTURE REINVENTS THE 
GOOD MOTHER xv (1994) (noting that these re-inventions are a mythology). Indeed, 
parenthood itself is ―political‖ and understanding how parents act as decision makers is 
noteworthy. LAUREL ELDER & STEVEN GREENE, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLITICIZATION AND POLARIZATION OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2012). 
 153. Horwitz, supra note 130, at 43.  
 154. THURER, supra note 152, at 294. 
 155. Id. at xvi.  
 156. Id. at xxiii. 
 157. Lazarus, supra note 36, at 35.  
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dren to the exclusion of a focus on one‘s own concerns as an adult.‖158 
Modern parenting is uniquely child-centered.159 While specific choices 
and strategies for parenting exist, this child-focused frame of modern 
parenting is ―widely shared and often unquestioned.‖160 Modern par-
enting is ―virtually synonymous with worry‖ as parents seek to en-
sure that their children are ―healthy—physically, mentally, and emo-
tionally.‖161 These modern anxieties distinctly position parents as 
more engaged in the ―formative stage, and believe that children‘s ex-
periences during the first two or three years of life mold their per-
sonality, lay the foundation for future cognitive and psychological 
development, and leave a lasting imprint on their emotional life.‖162  
 This approach—the shared focus on minimizing all fetal harms—
is critical to examine when understood through a tort law lens, to 
understand how this framework is problematic for the women who do 
not adopt it. These dominant practices become ―ritual[ized]‖ and then 
―transmit and reinforce gendered values‖163 that are, in turn, en-
shrined in tort standards of care, as explored below.  
IV.   WHY WHAT ―MOST WOMEN‖ DO IS CRITICAL TO 
AUTONOMY FOR ALL WOMEN 
 The question of what ―most women‖ do is deeply antithetical to 
reproductive rights advocacy. Women‘s reproductive rights advocacy 
has worked extensively to defend the childbirth choices and autono-
                                                                                                                                 
 158. MARGARET K. NELSON, PARENTING OUT OF CONTROL: ANXIOUS PARENTS IN 
UNCERTAIN TIMES 19 (2010) (noting how changes in technology such as baby monitors and 
GPS systems have changed parenting greatly).   
 159. Diane M. Hoffman, Power Struggles: The Paradoxes of Emotion and Control 
Among Child-Centered Mothers in Privileged America, in PARENTING IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 132, at 229 (describing how modern parents focus on the child‘s 
developmental needs and keenly respect the child as an individual).  
 160. Id. at 230. 
 161. APPLE, supra note 112, at 1. Beginning in the 1970s distinctly, ―parental anxieties 
greatly increased both in scope and intensity‖ as parents first sought to protect children 
from harms more consciously with inventions such as car seats, bike helmets, and baby-
proofing products. Parenting, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN HISTORY 
AND SOCIETY, http://www.faqs.org/childhood/Me-Pa/Parenting.html (last visited Feb. 10, 
2015) [hereinafter Parenting]. This stands in stark contrast to earlier framings of American 
parenting, which have shifted from ―adults in training‖ models to scientific models to the 
quest for emotional and psychological fulfillment. Id. The term ―parenting‖ itself is new—
injected with deep ―critiques of value, practice and ideals and critiques of power.‖ 
PARENTING IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 132, at 8; see also id. at 2 (― ‗[P]arenting‘ 
also demands a discussion of reflexivity and individual ‗identity work‘: to parent is to be 
discursively positioned by and actively contributing to the networks of idea, value, practice 
and social relations that have come to define a particular form of the politics of parent-
child relations within the domain of the contemporary family.‖). 
 162. Parenting, supra note 161.  
 163. Miller, supra note 83, at 59.   
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my of women, particularly where such rights are positioned in con-
flict with their doctors, with the state, and with the fetus.164  
 But tort law reveals what ―count[s]‖ as an injury in our society 
and which injuries matter more.165 Tort law is not an ―objective sys-
tem of adjudication‖; rather, value judgments are embedded within 
this system to distribute suffering.166 Tort law does not just recognize 
and compensate injuries; it ―does the political and social work of de-
termining what will count as an injury and, ultimately, how it will be 
distributed.‖167 
 It is thus critical that tort law standards are grounded in commu-
nity-based determinations of reasonable behavior that are entirely 
shaped by what ―most women‖ do. Thus, when a ―community shares 
a value widely‖ that dominant value can become the standard of 
care.168 For example, many states approach informed consent from 
the perspective of what is significant to the ―reasonable patient,‖ ef-
fectively ―most patients.‖169 For example, one informed consent birth-
ing form states, ―[f]etal monitoring by electronic machine is welcomed 
by the majority of mothers—any fears or questions?‖170  
 Communities in tort law are distinctly invoked to make negligence 
law palatable. Community-based standard setting helps to ―soften 
the hard surface‖ that the imposition of objective standards on indi-
                                                                                                                                 
 164. See, e.g., Amy Kay Boatright, State Control Over the Bodies of Pregnant Women, 
11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 903 (2001) (examining the state‘s authority to control a 
woman‘s body during her pregnancy); Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: 
Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97 
(2010) (examining how courts use the theoretical availability of alternative reproductive 
health services to prove that women‘s health will not suffer and that courts also blame 
women for the lack of available services in ways that undervalue women‘s health); V. 
Chandis & T. Williams, The Patient, the Doctor, the Fetus, and the Court-Compelled Cesar-
ean: Why Courts Should Address the Question Through a Bioethical Lens, 25 MED. & L. 729 
(2006) (presenting a bioethical lens to address conflict); Law, supra note 20, at 361-62; 
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Ce-
sareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Benjamin Grant Chojnacki, Note, Pushing Back: 
Protecting Maternal Autonomy from the Living Room to the Delivery Room, 23 
J.L. & HEALTH 45 (2010) (proposing changes to promote maternal autonomy).  
 165. SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN AND SAFETY 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2006) (―[E]normous amounts of discursive energy frame and 
consolidate what will count as rational behaviors and whose interests these will privilege.‖). 
 166. Id. at 34 (explaining how law functions in ―highly specific contexts‖ and reflects 
the socially constructed view of ―acceptable relations between persons and things‖). Tort 
law ―redistribute[s] human wounding . . . with vast implications of whose bodies the costs 
of progress fall into.‖ Id. at 5.  
 167. Id. at 2 (chronicling differences in legal responses to different types of product 
injuries).  
 168. Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1354-
55 (1994). 
 169. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 430. 
 170. KITZINGER, supra note 51, at 91. 
42  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:17 
 
 
viduals can create.171 Communities can stifle resentment of the more 
―distant, impersonal commands of negligence doctrine.‖172 It allows 
the law to ―outsource‖ the liability question to a group and ―away 
from an abstract universal ideal.‖173 
 The role of community-based consensus among doctors is distinct-
ly acute in setting standards of obstetric care. Tort law standards 
―require that physicians provide reasonable care under the circum-
stances, as judged against the level of knowledge and skill exercised 
by their professional peers.‖174 Tort law gives a heightened deference 
to the customs of the medical community.175 Obstetric medical practi-
tioners themselves set the standards of care that govern obstetrics, 
thus valuing collective professional medical organizations and con-
sensus heavily. This standard setting and the uniquely community-
based approach in which it occurs reveal how critical the tort law 
lens is to understanding the treatment of birthing women.  
 What ―most women‖ do is also important because it shapes our 
very understanding of injuries. We process injuries against a larger 
social and political backdrop in a process that is ―largely noncon-
scious or preconscious.‖176 ―[I]njuries are not objective facts; rather, 
they are events that humans perceive and interpret within ideational 
frameworks that reflect a deep interaction between self and cul-
ture.‖177 They are processed in the context of the physical environ-
ment in which they occur.178 The processing of an injury is subject to 
recursive interactional influences of friends, family, and others ―that 
takes place over time and draws third parties into the victim‘s pro-
cesses of cognition and response to injuries.‖179  
                                                                                                                                 
 171. Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 736 (2002). 
 172. Id. at 739. 
 173. Id. at 741. 
 174. Id. at 764. 
 175. Id. (explaining that, whereas for ―many other occupations [courts] think of custom 
as merely relevant or admissible, the law of medical malpractice equates custom or sub-
stantially accepted practice with the standard of care‖). Historically, this deference was 
quite problematic because the medical community perpetuated a norm of ―cohesion‖ that 
prevented physicians from testifying against each other in court. Id. at 764-65.  
 176. Engel, supra note 81, at 303-04; see also id. at 296, 321; id. at 328 (explaining how 
―[t]he embodied mind would integrate [an injury] instantly and nonconsciously into its life 
story, and the injury victim would very likely describe the injury to others, including 
friends, family, and co-workers, as well as professional service providers,‖ and with each 
retelling arises an ―opportunity for revision‖). 
 177. Id. at 319. 
 178. Id. at 314-18. 
 179. Id. at 306; id. at 328 (describing how with each retelling of an injury ―each listener 
might offer comments or reactions that alter the original perception and, recursively, help 
to create a revised narrative the next time around‖).  
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 The risk of bias is particularly problematic in the tort system. The 
tort system involves jurors comparing the conduct of stakeholders to 
their own ―prototypes of how reasonable people behave.‖180 Jurors can 
employ many biases in this process. Accordingly cognitive bias com-
plicates autonomy in cases where women seek to exercise their auton-
omy in ways other than that which most reduces risks to the fetus.181  
 So, while antithetical to conventional framings of women‘s birthing 
rights, the lens of what ―most women‖ do is critical to understanding 
the standard of care that is applied to all women in childbirth.  
V.   HOW DECISION-MAKING MODELS TO MINIMIZE FETAL 
HARMS CREATE AN ILLUSION OF AUTONOMY 
 While women‘s alignment with their doctors to choose the outcome 
that minimizes all fetal risks can actualize autonomy in individual 
cases, that approach—when adopted by communities of women—
risks becoming the standard of care that is applied to all women. The 
framework is problematic because it creates an illusion of autonomy 
given the ease with which doctors can ―preempt patient authority.‖182 
Women‘s autonomy can easily be overridden by the doctor unilateral-
ly selecting the outcome that best minimizes fetal risks and thereby 
foregoing actual informed consent and consideration of maternal 
risks. This positions doctors with a ―trump card‖ to play to ensure 
that maternal-doctor conflicts arise only rarely. For example, ―if you 
say to a woman that there‘s a 1% chance this may save the baby‘s 
life, she‘ll take it.‖183 This is particularly so in the context of cesarean 
sections: ―[m]ost women, if told by an obstetrician that a cesarean is 
best for the baby, go along with professional advice.‖184 Thus, the 
model looks at first glance like it actualizes women‘s autonomy, but it 
is an illusion because her decision is pre-ordained by the doctors‘ 
communication of fetal risks and can be easily over-stepped, ignoring 
maternal risks. It suggests that medical providers‘ ―conscious belief 
in women‘s autonomy may not translate to actual practice.‖185 Provid-
ing increased information to obstetric patients is not likely to change 
the outcomes.186 Thus, ―all but the most idiosyncratic patients will 
agree with the doctor‘s recommendation.‖187  
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 The illusion of autonomy can be seen in one medical text that pur-
ports to instruct obstetricians in responding to conflict with birthing 
women over medical decision-making. Clinical Obstetrics: The Fe-
tus & Mother includes a chapter on the medico-social considerations 
of pregnancy, which discusses the ―Ethical and Legal Dimensions of 
Medicine of the Pregnant Woman and Fetus.‖188 The text explains 
that any balancing between fetal benefit and maternal risk ―must 
recognize that a pregnant woman is obligated only to take reasonable 
risks of medical interventions that are reliably expected to benefit 
the viable fetus or later child.‖189 It states that, unbelievably, ―[s]uch 
conflict is best managed preventatively through the informed consent 
process as an ongoing dialogue throughout a woman‘s pregnancy 
augmented as necessary by negotiation and respectful persuasion.‖190 
 This illusion of autonomy can also be seen in the results of an 
Australian study considering health care professionals‘ perceptions of 
women‘s accountability and the providers‘ own legal accountability.191 
Notably, both midwives and doctors had previously agreed that wom-
en hold the right to autonomy in birthing.192 Participants were asked 
about the extent to which they agreed with this statement: ―In col-
laborative practice, working with primary carers, the final decision 
should always rest with the woman.‖193 Midwives agreed with this 
statement significantly more than doctors. When asked to rate disa-
greement with the statements, ― ‗For the safety of the baby, the ma-
ternity care team sometimes need[s] to override the needs of the 
woman‘ and ‗Encouraging women to have more control over their 
childbearing compromises safety,‘ ‖ doctors agreed that they some-
times had to override the woman‘s interests, but midwives were more 
neutral with respect to that statement.194 Midwives disagreed signifi-
cantly more than doctors with the idea that autonomy created safety 
concerns.195 Thus, doctors perceived a tension between autonomy and 
practice. As one researcher summarized, both midwives and obstetri-
cians ―only support women to make the final decision about an aspect 
of their care when this decision is what the care provider prefers.‖196 
American doctors ―expresse[d] a dedication to letting patients have 
                                                                                                                                 
 188. Judith L. Chervenak, Frank A. Chervenak & Lawrence B. McCullough, Ethical and 
Legal Dimensions of Medicine of the Pregnant Woman and Fetus, in CLINICAL OBSTETRICS: 
THE FETUS & MOTHER 1039 (E. Albert Reece & John C. Hobbins eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
 189. Id. at 1042. 
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. See Kruske et al., supra note 147.  
 192. Id. at 3. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 4. 
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decision-making power‖ but then described the patients‘ desires as 
―frivolous and as potentially conflicting with what [the doctor] de-
cides ‗needs to happen.‘ ‖197 ―Obstetricians continually described their 
primary role as sentries on the lookout for peril; they encountered 
conflicts as they heroically attempted to persuade misinformed or 
poorly informed patients to understand that doctors were the best 
judges of what is safe.‖198 This is the illusion of autonomy. 
 Medical providers reported ―a poor understanding of their own 
legal accountability, and the rights of the woman and her fetus.‖199 
This lack of clarity is problematic both for both women and their doc-
tors. Health care professionals need clear guidance on how to handle 
requests to refuse medical treatment specifically in a system that 
values evidence-based decision-making and autonomy.200  
 Technology can distinctly perpetuate the illusion of autonomy in 
its perceived objectivity, but its distinct focus is on fetal outcomes. 
Fetal monitoring technology emerged in the 1960s to project images 
of the fetus, ―seemingly independent‖ from the woman and ―taking on 
a human form.‖201 Notably, its scientific reliability and its necessity 
have been heavily contested.202  
 Fetal monitoring technology has ―displaced the woman‘s testimony 
from the central position it once held in the understanding of the fe-
tus and the development of her pregnancy.‖203 While a woman‘s sen-
sory awareness of her fetus, which long predated technological capa-
bilities, used to be valued, many would say that today it is ―complete-
ly ignored.‖204 Fetal imagery perpetuates the illusion of autonomy 
because ―representation of the fetus in isolation, abstracted from the 
body of the woman within which it is located, facilitates a perception 
of the fetus as a being that deserves no fewer rights than the wom-
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an.‖205 It produces an ―image of the fetus . . . independent of the uter-
us and sustains it, and by constituting the fetus as a patient in its 
own right, ultrasound has divided . . . the fetus from the pregnant 
woman.‖206 So, the use of fetal technology pushes the fetus‘s status as 
a patient forward, removes the woman‘s voice as a patient (to varying 
degrees), and yields a primacy in the ―objective‖ nature perceived to 
derive from fetal monitoring.207 ―The animation of fetal life through 
such imagery did more than just personify the fetus. As the fetus 
emerged as a person, the pregnant woman began literally to disappear 
from view.‖208 Indeed, fetal monitoring often triggers (many times inac-
curately) fetal distress, which is the basis for cesarean delivery.209 
 Yet, again, it is not exclusively a problem with medical profession-
als. While women have deferred to the medical expertise of doctors in 
childbirth for over a century,210 modern women distinctly defer to 
technological understandings of pregnancy and childbirth.211 For ex-
ample, many women describe fetal imagery as ―reassuring.‖212 The 
reliance on medical experts reveals the ―seduction of formal, medical-
ized preparation‖ for childbirth, seduction rooted in women‘s ―notions 
of risk, safety,‖ and desire to be ―seen to act responsibly.‖213 
 It is hard—if not impossible—for women to ―counterpoise the nat-
ural against the artificial, our intuitive, direct knowledge of our own 
bodies against the alien information derived from a machine.‖214 This 
is an example of ―demythologizing,‖ whereby women are not just try-
ing to disprove an outcome, but to break an entrenched stereotype, 
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which can be futile.215 Doctors can easily cut the birthing woman out 
of the decision-making metric and act directly in the interests of min-
imizing fetal harms. As the former chairman of the Department of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center 
in New York and co-chair of the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecologists‘ committee reviewing obstetric practices once conclud-
ed, ―we were beginning to forget that instruments such as electronic 
fetal monitors were tools to be used by the doctor, not decision-
making machines to replace medical judgment.‖216  
 This illusion of autonomy can—and indeed has—distorted the 
standard of care itself, thus implicating all women, as explored 
more below.  
VI.   WHEN THE DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK OF MOST WOMEN 
IS APPLIED TO ALL WOMEN IT PROBLEMATICALLY 
ALTERS MEDICAL STANDARDS OF CARE 
 The minimization of all fetal harms decision-making model is 
problematic because its replication by ―most women‖ in childbirth 
risks distorting the standard of care governing childbirth for all 
women. It suggests that the standard of care in childbirth requires 
complete compliance with medical advice and the minimization of all 
fetal risks. The actual standards of care, however, would require pa-
tient autonomy and only the minimization of unreasonable risks. 
This reveals the ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s217 medical model.  
A.   Minimization of All Fetal Harms Instead of 
Unreasonable Risks 
 Standards of care are ordinarily framed around unacceptable or 
unreasonable risks. Yet the risk-avoidance behaviors discussed above 
suggest an elevated standard of care that requires the elimination of 
any risk to the fetus. This is socially constructed risk avoidance.  
 Indeed some doctors do suggest that the ―minimization of fetal 
risks‖ is the lens that should govern women‘s decision-making. One 
explicit example of this thinking can be seen in the specialty text, 
Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine. The text acknowledg-
es the bodily integrity of the birthing woman as an ―important ethical 
value‖ crucial to the right of ―self-determination.‖218 It advises only 
―the most compelling of reasons‖ would allow for these rights to be 
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violated.219 It concludes that, while prevention of harm to the fetus is 
a ―serious concern,‖ it cannot override the ―normative personhood 
status‖ of the woman carrying the child.220 Yet, notably, the text then 
acknowledges repeatedly that the argument can be made that the 
woman has an ―obligation to promote the interests of her fetus‖ and 
that this obligation increases in advanced gestational states.221 It 
states that mothers owe ―an obligation to protect the offspring from 
harm.‖222 These statements suggest poignantly that some degree of 
conflict is avoided by a wholesome presumption—the imputation of 
an unwritten duty even—that women will always act to minimize 
fetal risks. 
B.   Complete Compliance with Medical Advice Has 
Never Been a Standard of Care 
 It further suggests that complete compliance with expert advice 
becomes the standard of care by which women are judged to be ―act-
ing responsibly and avoiding unnecessary risks.‖223  
During pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood, avoiding risk, and 
so being seen to be responsible, continues to involve placing trust 
in experts. To resist such engagement, to avoid screening tests, 
clinic visits and expert advice would be regarded as irresponsible 
behaviour. Such actions would be seen to jeopardise the woman‘s 
own health ―and more importantly, that of the foetus she is carry-
ing and expected to protect and nourish in a proper maternal 
manner.‖224 
As one woman articulated, ―[t]here comes a point where you feel not 
trusting your doctor is not trusting your own judgment because you 
put time into selecting him and, should you begin to doubt him, you 
lose confidence in your own ability to make sound judgments.‖225  
 The ―reasonable patient‖ matters greatly to tort law from the per-
spective of juror perception, comparative negligence claims, and in-
formed consent models. Thus, the idea that all women are normalized 
toward a particular decision-making framework marginalizes those 
who adopt a different framework. Doctors‘ accounts of patient inter-
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actions indeed describe ―noncompliant patients as irritating and irra-
tional.‖226 One doctor explains the discomfort of patient autonomy:  
[Patient autonomy] makes it much more difficult. So I try to ex-
plain, in layman‘s terms always, the consequences of the decisions 
and empower the patient to make the choice. Almost always they‘ll 
end up choosing my recommendation when they realize that the 
choice is theirs. It‘s very rare for someone, when they understand 
that my training says that [if] we go down this road, we do have 
the risk of compromising the baby, most folks choose and trust my 
training. Occasionally, when they don‘t, it‘s very difficult, but we 
can‘t assault someone, you know!227  
Researchers describe how the obstetrician quoted above ―saw her ex-
pertise as ultimately trumping patients‘ contradictory viewpoints. 
She portrays women‘s acquiescence as informed and sensible decision 
making rather than as an act of submission. As she sees it, patients 
must trust her to be the judge of whether what happens poses a risk 
to the baby.‖228 Requiring complete compliance with medical guidance 
would be distinct to childbirth, as any other patient can decline  
medical treatment.  
It is only in the context of pregnancy that doctors assert the right 
to compel their patients to heed medical advice. Doctors‘ responses 
to their pregnant patients therefore emerge as a startling excep-
tion to the nearly universal consensus that patients, not doctors, 
should control determinations about whether and when to undergo 
medical treatment.229 
 This is particularly problematic when understood in conjunction 
with the preceding point whereby the standard is minimizing all fe-
tal risks. Women must cede to medical authority at the expense of 
their own autonomy, but also often at the expense of their own medi-
cal risks. One author describes this as a ―gestalt picture‖ where ―[a]s 
the fetus comes into view, the woman disappears.‖230 Thus, women 
have lost their autonomy and are being medically compelled to a self-
sacrificial view of motherhood. ―Good mothers, it is implied, should 
always wish to do what Doctor considers best for the fetus and un-
questioningly take his advice.‖231  
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C.   The Ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s Medical Model 
 This complete compliance with medical authority further reveals 
the resurrection of the ghost of Roe v. Wade‘s232 medical model. The 
medical model in Roe positioned pregnant women as shared decision-
makers with doctors, but really entrusted doctors with primacy. Roe 
squarely positioned the decision to terminate a pregnancy as a medi-
cal decision, and moreover, one in which the doctor distinctly held 
primacy over the pregnant woman.233 The Court held that, in the first 
trimester, the abortion decision ―must be left to the medical judgment 
of the pregnant woman‘s attending physician.‖234 In the third tri-
mester, the Court limited the state‘s regulatory power by mandating 
an exception to prohibitions on abortion ―where it is necessary, in ap-
propriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health 
of the mother.‖235 Roe thus described the decision as one that ―vindi-
cates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment ac-
cording to his professional judgment‖ and characterized the decision 
as ―a medical decision‖ the ―basic responsibility for [which] must rest 
with the physician.‖236 
 When read in conjunction with Doe v. Bolton,237 the medical lens 
was notably a broad one—at least initially and doctrinally—that po-
sitioned the physician to make decisions based on women‘s health, 
age, family status, and emotional well-being. In Bolton, the compan-
ion case to Roe, the Court further reinforced and explained the medi-
cal frame of the decision to terminate a pregnancy. In Bolton, the ap-
pellants challenged the criminal abortion statute in Georgia.238 The 
statute had an exception de-criminalizing abortions when ―continua-
tion of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant woman 
or would seriously and permanently injure her health,‖ but it hinged 
that exception on the ―best clinical judgment‖ of a physician.239 The 
plaintiffs challenged the statute, arguing that the ―necessary‖ lan-
guage was not objective enough and fearing that doctors would 
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―choose to err on the side of caution and will be arbitrary.‖240 The 
Court upheld the district court‘s holding that ―health‖ was not vague 
and was ―a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to 
make routinely whenever surgery is considered,‖ explaining that the 
physicians‘ medical judgment 
may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, 
psychological, familial, and the woman‘s age—relevant to the well-
being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This al-
lows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best 
medical judgment. And it is room that operates for the benefit, not 
the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.241 
Roe‘s progeny later modified this health exception in critical ways by 
limiting abortion to only the most extreme of medical harms facing 
the pregnant woman—functionally to save the life of the pregnant 
woman only.242 The breadth of the medical framing in Bolton is par-
ticularly noteworthy in the context of woman-doctor alignments. No-
tably, the ―medical model‖ of abortion empowered doctors in repro-
ductive decision-making and further empowered doctors to police 
their own professional membership.243  
 Roe‘s adoption of the medical model was widely criticized, yet it 
persists.244 It is widely accepted that abortion jurisprudence has since 
shifted to the woman‘s right to choose, away from a doctor‘s right to 
decide in consultation with her. Yet, while abortion was character-
ized in Roe distinctly in the context of health care, the health care 
delivery model for pregnancy termination became quickly isolated 
among specialist doctors in specialized medical facilities. Current 
framings of reproductive health ―sever[] the right to decide to termi-
nate a pregnancy from access to healthcare necessary to exercise that 
decision.‖245 The systematic access issues that this marginalization 
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creates are well documented and understood.246 Pregnancy termina-
tion services have been pushed out of health care models, and the 
physicians who provide the care have been pushed out of professional 
and social regard. The doctors who provide termination services have 
been demonized, marginalized, and ostracized from the medical pro-
fession through professional regulations, litigation, harassment, and 
violence. 
 The problematic bifurcation of obstetric health care and pregnan-
cy termination health care was poignantly articulated in Gonzales v. 
Carhart.247 The Court concluded that doctors protect fetal interests, 
―abortion doctors‖ protect women‘s autonomy, women are naturally 
destined to be mothers, and women who seek to terminate a preg-
nancy need to be protected.248 Indeed, Justice Kennedy in Carhart 
specifically reflected the magnification of medicalized fetal interests 
within the medical profession. His opinion reads as ―[d]eeply skepti-
cal that the medical profession has used the health exception in good 
faith,‖ and he ―seems to believe instead that physicians have used the 
health exception as a proxy for promoting women‘s autonomy at the 
expense of fetal life.‖249 Carhart reveals this bias most poignantly, not 
only ―sever[ing] abortion from healthcare, but also appear[ing] hostile 
to abortion providers,‖ describing them pejoratively as ―abortion doc-
tors‖ and suggesting that women need to be ―protected from provid-
ers‖ who might fail to inform or guide them properly in their deci-
sion.250 This is a distinctly ―woman-protective argument.‖251 The 
Court suggested that it was not just that women need to be protected 
from poor decision-making; it is that women who seek to exercise 
their decision-making autonomy in any way other than with a fetal 
focus are in need of protective barriers. It is a false choice for women: 
either act to protect fetal life or the state needs to protect you from 
your decision-making.252  
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 While the medical model that bestows doctors with decision-
making primacy over women has been largely abandoned in the con-
text of pregnancy termination, this analysis suggests that its legacy 
persists and pervades obstetric care. Margo Kaplan concluded that 
Carhart‘s ―rationale can be imported into cases involving the medical 
treatment of women who wish to continue their pregnancies to 
term.‖253 Carhart‘s depiction of the ―state interest in fetal life and ma-
ternal health‖ is cast ―so broadly that it essentially creates new, du-
bious state interests that, in the context of compelled treatment cas-
es, expand state justifications for requiring medical treatment of 
pregnant women, even where such treatment would harm women‘s 
health.‖254 This expanded reach of the state has problematic traction 
when understood in light of the modern framings of motherhood and 
parenting on which it feeds, as discussed above.  
VII.   RE-WRITING AND RE-RIGHTING OBSTETRIC 
STANDARDS OF CARE 
 Reproductive rights advocates have fought for decades to achieve 
women‘s autonomy in childbirth, yet successes have not been univer-
sal or fully incorporated into clinical practices.255  
A.   Methodological Standards of Care 
 To remedy the illusion of autonomy and the risks it poses to the 
standard of care, tort liability is needed for the dignitary harms cre-
ated by the illusion of autonomy—methodological breaches in the 
standard of care. Incentive systems need to be changed in tort law to 
ensure that doctors are incentivized to emphasize how a decision is 
made, not just the substantive outcomes.  
 Doctors admit that methodological process is not prioritized. For 
example, one obstetrician quoted in a survey revealed the absence of 
methodological standards of care: ―I think there are some patients 
who get very focused on the process, and all they care about is the 
process . . . . But for me, it is the end result. Do we have a good mom 
and a good baby? That‘s what you try to do.‖256 Researchers studying 
medical behavior and interviewing doctors explained how clients care 
about the birthing process, but doctors view their goal as ―limiting 
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bad things‖ and ―achiev[ing] a good outcome.‖257 Doctors de-
prioritized a ―process-related orientation‖ as less important than a 
―medicalized orientation‖ because the former can ―jeopardize results, 
and concentrating on results justifies not attending to process.‖258 In 
this medicalized framework, the ―most important accomplishment is 
getting the baby out of the woman.‖259  
 Accordingly, methodological standards are needed to standardize 
the delivery of care.260 Because tort law has such strong ―radiating 
effects,‖ it is critical to clearly articulate decision-making norms that 
can, in turn, directly shape and inform public discourse.261 Specifical-
ly, obstetric standards of care do not explicitly address how to resolve 
conflicts deriving from the simultaneous treatment of birthing wom-
en and their fetuses. Existing models are either nonexistent or not 
functional.  
 Informed consent only creates tort liability based on the actualiza-
tion of negative outcomes, not the methodology itself. Informed con-
sent examines whether a doctor negligently failed to disclose the na-
ture, alternatives, risks, and consequences of a suggested treat-
ment.262 The physician proposing treatment is required to inform the 
patient about all ―material risks,‖ which include serious risks, even 
those with minute chances of actually occurring.263 The traditional 
standard focuses on what a reasonable medical professional would 
tell patients about the nature, alternatives, risks, and consequences 
of a given treatment.264 Some jurisdictions have adopted a standard in 
which the test is what ―the reasonable patient would want to know.‖265  
                                                                                                                                 
 257. Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 258. Id. (―Doctors did not represent birth as only pathological or risky, by any means, 
but they depicted it as always potentially pathological or risky. If you never know when 
disaster can strike, you must always be a sentinel.‖).  
 259. Id. at 219, 222 (―[Within this discourse of OBs,] instrumental and operative deliv-
eries are not conceptualized as risks to women, because risk is conceptualized as emanat-
ing from women‘s bodies gone wrong or awry, rather than from acts done to women‘s bodies 
by medical professionals.‖). 
 260. See, e.g., Lisa Pratt, Access to Vaginal Birth After Cesarean: Restrictive Policies 
and the Chilling of Women‘s Medical Rights During Childbirth, 20 WILLIAM & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 105, 121-22 (2013) (concluding that the notion that ―all that matters is a 
healthy mom and healthy baby‖ does a disservice to women and babies because ―women 
must be full participants in their pregnancies‖ so as not to ―compromise the manner in 
which we attain the stated goal‖). ―Everyone agrees that healthy moms and healthy babies 
are important, but that goal must be carried out in a manner that acknowledges that the 
process is as important as the end result.‖ Id. at 122.  
 261. Anne Bloom, The Radiating Effects of Torts, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 229, 233-34 (2013). 
 262. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 195 (12th ed. 2010).  
 263. Id. at 196.  
 264. Id. at 195. 
 265. Id. at 196-97. 
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 Modern reproductive rights arguments are being fought over the 
―winner take all‖ autonomy or primacy fight. Reproductive rights ad-
vocates have championed absolute women‘s autonomy in reproduc-
tive decision-making, while opponents have argued for absolute per-
sonhood and fetal primacy.266 Analyzing the deeper social and cultur-
al anchoring—as understood through the tort system—suggests re-
productive rights advocates might be pursuing an unduly risky strat-
egy by engaging the battle on these terms. It suggests that a method-
ological standard of care might be the most effective way to effectu-
ate autonomy consistent with tort standards of care.  
B.   Using Decision-Making Aids 
 Tort standards of care should impose methodological standards of 
care for how decisions are made to ensure that the patient retains 
decision-making autonomy and that thoughtful, effective consulta-
tion is encouraged beyond traditional informed consent models.267 De-
cision-making aids should be required within the governing tort 
standard of care. Interactive decision-making aids facilitate effective 
decision-making and the processing of information.268  
 Decision aids are tools that ―collect and analyze the latest clinical 
evidence regarding the risks and benefits of different treatment op-
tions and then present the information in a manner patients can un-
derstand.‖269 The process is to be collaborative with various stake-
holders across various disciplines,270 including clinical researchers, 
practicing physicians, health services researchers, biostatisticians, 
and others, and they are regularly reviewed ―to ensure both the accu-
racy and integrity of the information conveyed.‖271 The decision aids 
provide information on the pros and cons of each option in an unbi-
ased manner. In addition, the aids often offer video interviews and 
testimonials from patients and physicians regarding positive and 
negative experiences with each outcome and explanations for limita-
                                                                                                                                 
 266. ―[A]ntichoice activists have used fetal rights and mortality as their primary justi-
fication for restricting abortion . . . .‖ CARON, supra note 102, at 251. 
 267. See generally King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 480.  
 268. Id. See generally CTR. FOR PERINATAL HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, MAKING CHOICES: 
OPTIONS FOR A PREGNANT WOMAN WITH A BREECH BABY: A DECISION AID FOR WOMEN (2006), 
available at http://sydney.edu.au/medicine/public-health/shdg/docs/Breech_DA.pdf.  
 269. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 464. See generally INFORMED MED. DECISIONS 
FOUND., FOUNDATION-FUNDED RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: ADVANCING OUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
HOW MEDICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE (Jan. 2013), available at http://informedmedical 
decisions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Research_Highlights.pdf (compiling all of the 
research the grants of the Informed Medical Decisions Foundation have supported over the 
last decade as they have worked to measure the problem, assess the quality of medical 
decision-making, and measure decision quality).  
 270. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S38. 
 271. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 464. 
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tions in evidence for one treatment over another.272 Patients are giv-
en ample time to then digest and process the information and to 
make their communications with their physicians more fruitful.273  
 Childbirth is distinctly well-positioned for decision-making aids 
because there is time to plan and prepare.274 It is also cost-effective to 
create decision aids for childbirth because the decisions are repeated 
so many times and so consistently. In fact, some decision aids already 
exist for certain medical procedures.275  
 Decision aids are currently being integrated into various legisla-
tive and clinical settings.276 The Federal Affordable Care Act, for ex-
ample, makes grants available to health care providers ―for the de-
velopment and implementation of shared decision-making techniques 
and to assess the use of such techniques.‖277 Various medical centers 
in the United States have started experimenting with decision-
making aids.278 A Washington statute also requires competent pa-
                                                                                                                                 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Sakala & Corry, supra note 23, at 66 (―[P]regnant women have many months 
to prepare and would benefit from high-quality information and decision support relating 
to labor and birth well before labor.‖).  
 275. See, e.g., Research Summaries for Consumers, Clinicians, and Policymakers: Pregnancy 
and Childbirth, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, available at http://www.effective 
healthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/research-summaries-for-consumers-clinicians-and-policymakers/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (citing existing aids regarding the induction of labor).  
 276. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 465. 
 277. Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(e)(3)(A) (2010). See generally id. § 299b-
36 (stating that the purpose of this section is to ―facilitate collaborative processes between 
patients, caregivers or authorized representatives, and clinicians that engages the patient, 
caregiver or authorized representative in decision making, provides patients, caregivers or 
authorized representatives with information about trade-offs among treatment options, 
and facilitates the incorporation of patient preferences and values into the medical plan‖); 
Samuel F. Hansen, The Role of Decision Aids in the Affordable Care Act, STAN. J. PUB. 
HEALTH (2013), available at http://web.standford.edu/group/sjph/cgi-bin/sjphsite/the-role-of-
decision-aids-in-the-affordable-care-act/. Section 3506 of the Affordable Care Act, ―Program 
to Facilitate Shared Decision-making,‖ provides standards for the developing, implementa-
tion, funding, and certification of decision aids within the national health care system. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506, 124 Stat. 119, 527 
(2010). The section facilitates decision aids by funding a third party entity which will de-
velop standards based on medical consensus and certify patient decision-making aids for 
use by federal health programs. Id. at 527-29. Patient decision aid is defined as ―an educa-
tion tool that helps patients, caregivers or authorized representatives understand and 
communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their treatment options and to decide 
with their health care provider what treatments are best for them based on their treatment 
options, scientific evidence, circumstances, beliefs and preferences.‖ Id. at 527. The aids 
inform patients and their families of the benefits, risks, costs and effectiveness of tests and 
treatments. See Emily Oshima Lee & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Shared Decision Making to Im-
prove Care and Reduce Costs, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 7 (2013).  
 278. Moulton & King, supra 113, at 91 (highlighting a Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical 
Center for Shared Decision-Making); see also Informed Choice, DARTMOUTH INST., 
http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/research/engaging/informed-choice (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) 
(explaining that shared decision-making is needed when there are multiple choices, each 
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tients to sign written acknowledgement that she engaged in shared 
decision-making with a certified decision aid.279  
 The process of developing decision aids would also strengthen evi-
dence-based standards of care. They would reveal the ―critical gaps in 
the evidence needed for decision making on [specific obstetric deci-
sions], then fund and conduct targeted research with time frames 
that can compare short-term and longer-term outcomes and costs.‖280  
 Embedding a decision-aid framework within the standard of care 
by which doctors consult with their patients would help remedy the 
issues described here. This is a tool to facilitate the decision outcome, 
separate and distinct from informed consent, by which the doctor 
presents the risks and benefits. One study considered the efficacy in 
presenting a decision-aid framework to help women decide whether 
to have a subsequent caesarean birth after a prior cesarean deliv-
ery.281 The study concluded that such a tool was useful in helping 
women consider the risks and benefits of delivery options, and it im-
proved the extent to which they felt informed, but it did not improve 
their relationships with their health care provider.282 High-quality 
decisions come from ―a strategy of ‗vigilance‘, where the decision-
maker searches for information that is relevant to the decision, as-
similates information in an unbiased manner and then appraises the 
alternatives before making a choice.‖283 A workable decision-making 
framework would need to acknowledge individual habits that skew 
toward ―unquestioned acceptance, responsibility shifting, rationalisa-
tion, bolstering of the least stressful alternative and inattention to 
additional information that would involve change.‖284 Framing a deci-
sion-making model would account for the real-world realities of decision-
making in the context of time and environmental constraints, such as 
family or social commitments, relationships, and risk averseness.285  
                                                                                                                                 
with its own advantages and disadvantages, none of which is a clear ―correct‖ choice, but 
rather the ―correct‖ choice depends on individual factors and values). 
 279. Moulton & King, supra 113,  at 92. 
 280. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S38. 
 281. Allison Shorten et al., Preparing Consumers for Shared Decisions: Analyzing the 
Effectiveness of a Decision-Aid for Women Making Choices About Birth After Caesarean, in 
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 73 (Elizabeth P. Blakely ed., 2007) 
(studying 227 women). This is a complicated decision because both options are considered 
―safe‖ for most women, and both options involve some degree of risk for the mother and the 
baby. Id. at 78. The risk of uterine rupture is relatively small, less than one-half percent, 
but the consequences of the risk occurring are huge—hysterectomy or fetal death. Id.  
 282. Id. at 93-94. 
 283. Id. at 76. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 77, 79. 
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 Decision aids better perpetuate a model of autonomy. They allow 
the patient to ―make an autonomous choice to participate in a full or 
limited way or not at all in making the final decision after receiving 
the relevant information.‖286 Thus, patients can elect to defer fully to 
medical judgment in ways that remain consistent with autonomy, but 
it is not per se the standard of care that they have to do so.287 In that 
sense, the aids are beneficial to doctors and patients alike. For doc-
tors, decision aids would better address the accountability fears of 
medical practitioners who perceive conflicts between tort liability for 
bad fetal outcomes in obstetric care and actualizing women‘s auton-
omy. Including a decision-making framework in the standard of care 
would better protect doctors when bad fetal outcomes occur and bet-
ter protect women‘s autonomy in the cases where women deviate 
from normalized mainstream decision-making methodologies. 
 Decision-making aids can be an effective tool to deter the cognitive 
bias created by the experiences of most women and most doctors in 
tort law. Cognitive bias researchers describe that several mecha-
nisms can reduce or eliminate the problems of cognitive bias. The re-
placement of human intuition—the origin of cognitive bias—with 
formal procedures can strengthen decision-making frameworks.288 
Many decision-makers lack appropriate ―codes‖ to detect bias. How-
ever, this can be remedied by external calibrations.289 Researchers 
generally believe that it is possible to ―debias‖ a problem; subjects 
when faced with ―falsifying evidence . . . generally did reject their hy-
potheses . . . and respond accordingly,‖ ―suggest[ing] that subjects 
may be passive rather than active.‖290 In that sense, decision aids can 
also be a highly effective response to race, class, and ethnic differ-
ences in child care decision-making.291  
 Yet the aids themselves need to be managed for risks of bias, 
which, of course, is extremely sensitive within the history of the 
state‘s problematic regulation of informed consent in abortion.292 To 
                                                                                                                                 
 286. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 436. 
 287. Id. 
 288. JONATHAN ST. B.T. EVANS, BIAS IN HUMAN REASONING: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 114-15 (1989) (explaining the general belief that critical thinking is a skill 
that can be taught, yet expressing skepticism regarding this accepted conclusion). 
 289. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1129-30 (1974). 
 290. EVANS, supra note 288, at 49-50 (noting, however, that the de-biasing mechanisms 
need to be more interactive than just instructions to decision-makers).  
 291. Angood et al., supra note 35, at S30. 
 292. Moulton & King, supra note 113, at 92 (describing a tension with how states have 
managed abortion informed consent and proposing resolution through effective certification 
procedures).  
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ensure that materials are unbiased, proper certification from neutral 
bodies is required.293 
 Decision aids are also uniquely time and resource intensive to 
prepare as a tool.294 They are further burdensome on physicians to 
implement.295 Yet they can achieve critical improvements in ―patient 
comprehension‖ and ―decisional conflict,‖ and they can also achieve 
some ―improved health outcomes.‖296  
 Successful implementation of decision aids requires compulsion 
through a tort-based standard of care. Absent a clear standard of 
care requiring such methodological precision, doctors lack the incen-
tives and tools to implement.297 The standard of care would need to 
explicitly protect doctors who follow careful methodological decision-
making from later litigation. For example, the Washington State bill 
treats the signed acknowledgment of shared decision-making with the 
use of a decision aid as prima facie evidence of informed consent.298  
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 The complexities of obstetric care where dual duties are owed to 
both the fetus and the birthing women suggest that there should be 
more conflict in obstetric care. Many women and their doctors resolve 
this complexity by deploying a decision-making model to minimize all 
fetal risks. This standard is unworkable and intolerable because it 
perpetuates a mere illusion of women‘s autonomy. The deference to 
medical determinations of fetal risks further resurrects the ghost of 
Roe v. Wade‘s medical model. It grossly deviates from baseline stand-
ards of care by exaggerating the severity of fetal risks and undervalu-
ing even unreasonable risks to the birthing women. Cognitive bias 
further entrenches this implicit model and exacerbates it along class, 
race, and ethnic lines. Tort law should care about the methodology of 
decision-making, just as it cares about the substance. Furthermore, it 
should be used to create/install the methodology by which women can 
regain/establish their actual autonomy over medical decision-making.  
  
                                                                                                                                 
 293. King & Moulton, supra note 124, at 466. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Moulton & King, supra note 113, at 90 (explaining how it has been challenging to 
integrate decision aids in practice because of administrative challenges and a lack of finan-
cial and legal incentives).  
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. at 92.  
 298. Id. Washington State positions shared decision-making as ―an alternative means 
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